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The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and 
Limits in Comparative Law* 
by M. T. Meulders-Klein** 
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted 
among men .... " 
-Extractfrom the Declaration of Independence of the 
of the United States of America, July 4, 1776 
"None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond the 
egoistic man, man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an 
individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, 
wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance 
with his private caprice." 
- Extract from Karl Marx, The Jewish Question 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Of all the controversial and burning issues of the present time, the one which we 
approach here is without doubt one of the most difficult. However possible it may 
be, at least in the ideal, to arrange the answers to the great problems of today 
according to a fundamental principle - that of respect for the human person, his 
rights and his dignity - it is an infinitely more delicate matter to question the extent 
of these rights and freedoms when they are exercised by the individual upon his 
own person, upon that which is most precious and personal to the individual: his 
body, his physical and mental integrity and his very life itself. 
Admittedly the problem is not nove!.1 One need only review the opinions and 
* The original French title is Le droit <k disposer <k soi-mime, etendue et limites en droit compare. The 
French "disposer de" is roughly equivalent to the English notion of dominion in the sense of ownership, 
including the power to alienate and to do anything one wants with one's self. 
This article was originally published in French in the Acts of the XTHJOURNEES D'ETUDESJURIDIQUES 
JEAN DABIN (1980). The footnotes, instead of conforming to Blue Book form, reflect the style of the 
original publication. 
** Professor of the Faculty of Law of the University of Louvain (Belgium). 
1. In addition to the various treaties and texts which have confronted the question in the context of 
subjective law, numerous theses and essays have discussed the problem of safeguarding the individual's 
rights with respect to his person. See, e.g., G. Sarvonat, Le principe de l'inviolabilite du corps humain en 
droit civil (Poitiers 1951) (thesis); J. L. Edde, Les droits extracomractuels relatifs au corps humain (Paris 
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diverse attitudes of the ancient Greeks and Romans regarding suicide, to men-
tion only one example. Plato condemned suicide as an act of cowardice and the 
Athenians sanctioned the suicide victim after his death, whereas Seneca pro-
claimed that "whosoever views suicide as criminal does not realize that he is 
closing off the path which leads to freedom."2 The assertion that "your body 
belongs to you," which caused such a scandal at the beginning of this century and 
has continued to serve as a slogan, is well-known. However, this view has not 
gained unanimous acceptance in its absolute form. Opposing it are too many 
contrary interests. In truth, it is and has been for a long time the very conception 
of man and his freedom which is at stake. 
Two developments, however, have lent the current debate a new edge and 
dimension. Two elements which are, without doubt, known to everyone, but 
whose dimensions should be measured in order to better sound the depths ofthe 
problem, present as well as future, and to ponder their reach. These elements 
are, on the one hand, the prodigious development of biomedical technology and, 
on the other hand, the deep-seated changes in societal attitudes. 
The growth in biomedical knowledge and technology merits discussion first, 
because it has given rise to an unprecedented revolution in thinking with respect 
to the underlying premises of the problem. No one, in effect, would have 
dreamed at the turn of the century that one day it would be possible not only to 
improve the means to save man from and cure him of illness through phar-
macology and the medical-surgical technology available today, but also to ma-
nipulate life and death to the point of shattering their boundaries and rewriting 
their laws. Not only to decode the mysteries of heredity, but to identify its basic 
elements, to discover defects even before birth and to master genetic science to 
the point of creating new species in defiance of the laws of sexual reproduction 
would have been unthinkable. The ability to disassociate sexuality from procrea-
tion by near infallible methods, to proceed to human fertilization in vitro and to 
transplant the embyro into the body of a woman who is not the mother confers 
upon man an un precedented mastery over himself. The ability to modify the 
psyche through brain surgery or drugs, to transform, however imperfectly, a 
person's sex, to transplant essential organs such as the heart, to prolong life not 
only beyond all earlier dreams of longevity which man has realized, but also be-
yond even the extinction of vital functions, which formerly signified the moment 
1954) (thesis); R. Damages, Le corps humain dens Ie commerce juridique (Nancy 1957) (thesis); 
A. Goergen, Les droits de l'homme sur son corps (Nancy 1957) (thesis), ~ited in Nerson, La protection de La 
persanne en droit privefroncais, 13 TRAvAux DE L'ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT 70 n.4 (1959-60); Saint 
Alary, Les droits de /'lwmme sur son propre corps, i958 ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT DE TOULOUSE; 
A. DECocQ, ESSAI D'UNE THEORIE GENERALE DES DROITS SUR LA PERSONNE (Paris, L.G.D.]. 1960); 
J. Pelissier, La sauvegarde de l'integrite physique de la personne (Paris 1977) (thesis). In Belgium: 
R. DIERKENS, LEs DROITS SUR LE CORPS ET LE CADAVRE DE L'HOMME (Paris, Masson 1966) [hereinafter 
cited as DIERKENS]. In Canada: A. MAYRAND, L'INVIOLABIUTE DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE (McGill Univer-
sity, Wainwright Lectures, Wilson et Lafleur 1975) [hereinafter cited as MAYRAND]. 
2. See 2 SENECA, BOOK VI (Letter no. 58 to LucilIius) (Bude ed. 1949). 
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of death, and to render sterilization and abortion simpler, if not more com-
monplace, obliges man to reexamine entirely the problem. 
Second, a change of attitude has occurred, to the extent that man, freed from 
the need to struggle as rigorously for simple subsistence survival, at least in the 
West - and without overlooking the illusion of unlimited growth - has devel-
oped an immense thirst for well-being. The change has also been a decisive one 
to the extent that progress in medical technology, which has without doubt 
largely contributed to whet this thirst, has found in man's yearning a predisposi-
tion to use unconditionally everything which may allow him to tame nature and 
avert suffering. Viewed in this context, it is evident that although the right to 
deal with one's own body is not a new problem, new fundamentals in medical 
knowledge have uncovered a crucial, yet unknown, dimension. They have al-
tered the very conception of man, life and death by offering the means to control 
them and the temptation to do so. Furthermore, whereas it is true that each step 
forward in scientific knowledge constitutes a point of no-return, and that each 
new technique beckons irresistibly its use - absent a deliberate renunciation -
scientific knowledge alone cannot furnish the moral rules to govern its technical 
application.3 Science has left a blank space for other disciplines to fill.4 
The debate over the ethical and legal problems sparked by the development 
and application of the biomedical sciences has evolved mainly in the so-called 
developed countries.5 However, responses to the problem are far from being in 
agreement, nor are they lacking in ambiguity. An example is the attempt to set 
limitations on experimentation, human or otherwise.6 Unanimity is even more 
elusive when the problem concerns precisely the right over one's body: namely, 
the right of the individual to do with his body as he sees fit, to control his 
activities, his life and his power to give life. 
The conflict in underlying values here concerns less the traditional problem of 
state-society noninterference in the fundamental rights of the individual, than 
the infinitely more formidable conflict between two fundamental rights of man 
himself: the inviolability of his person, which postulates its inalienability; and 
man's freedom, namely, his right to self-determination, which is precisely that 
which sets man apart from other creatures. Does the inviolability of the person, 
that we admit today constitute - or should constitute - a bulwark against all 
outside aggression, private or public, also act as a bulwark against the person 
3. C. BRUAIRE, UNE ETHIQUE POUR LA MEDICINE 19 (Fayard 1978). 
4. L. SEBAG, MARXISME ET STRUCTURAUSME 246 (Payot 1964). 
5. In truth, this has been the case longer and to a greater extent in Anglo-American countries where 
it has provoked a great deal of literature on the subject, as opposed to European countries, which have 
lagged somewhat behind. This explains why the author has largely gone to Anglo-American sources, 
without, however, neglecting available European sources. . 
6. See Baudouin, L'experimentation sur us humains: un conflit de valeurs [hereinafter cited as Baudouin]; 
Hennau-Hublet, us pojets de regumentation de I'experimentation sur us humains [hereinafter cited as 
Hennau-Hublet] in LICEITE EN DROIT POSITIF ET REFERENCES LEGALES AUX VALEURS, ACTES DES XES 
JOURNEES D'ETUDES JURI DIQUES JEAN DABIN OF 1930 (to be published by Bruylant, Brussels, 1982). 
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himself? Or, on the contrary, does man's freedom postulate that he enjoy total 
dominion over his body, with the unconditional right to make use of it and 
dispose of it as he sees fit? Formulated in these terms, the question harbors, at 
the very least, a contradiction. 
It is this contradiction, as well as the meaning of the historical process from 
which it emanates, that the author explores by examining the emergence of the 
principle of inviolability, and the shift towards self-determination, together with 
a comparison of European and American law. 
II. THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE PERSON AND THE UNALIENABILITY 
OF THE HUMAN BODY 
The person is inviolable. The human body is unalienable. These principles 
with which we are so familiar are for us doctrines of fundamental truth. Curi-
ously, they do not figure explicitly in the Belgian Constitution nor in the Belgian 
Civil Code.1 Only the Penal Code implicitly provides a partial yet basic affirma-
tion of these propositions. 8 Constitutions and codes of other countries are more 
explicit." 
What exactly do these principles stand for? They signify foremost a triumph, 
and not a mere truism, contrary to what one might be lead to believe by the very 
idea of "natural rights," supposedly so innate in human beings as to be directly 
7. The Old Belgian Constitution of 1830 simply advances the principle of equality of all Belgians 
before the law, in Article 6, and clarifies the fundamental freedoms considered to be the principal 
legacy ofrevolutionary liberalism in Articles 7 to 24. The fundamental rights of man to life and physical 
integrity are not formally set forth therein, and the recent efforts at constitutional revision have not 
created anything new. However, the doctrine sees in the declaration of the right to individual freedom 
in Article 7 an implicit assertion of the right to life and physical integrity, without which freedom would 
fall. See I F. DELPEREE, LEs DONNEES CONSTITUTION NELLES No. 144 DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (Brussels, 
Larcier 1980). See also La declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789, to which reference is 
made by the Preamble to the French Constitution of Oct. 4, 1958. See M. DUVERGER, CONSTITUTIONS ET 
DOCUMENTS POLITIQUES 9, 233 (Paris, P.U.F. 1971). 
8. Civil law, it is true, indirectly sanctions assault upon life or limb, caused by the voluntary or 
involuntary action of third persons, through rules of civil liability. But the Civil Code nowhere mentions 
the right as such. It is the Penal Code which directly provides for sanctions against murder and battery, 
where the right to life and physical integrity stands out most clearly. See I TROUSSE, Les novelles, DROIT 
PENAL No. 55 [hereinafter cited as TROUSSE); Legros, Essai sur l'aulonomie du droit penal, REVUE DE DROIT 
PENAL ET CRIMINEL 143 (1956-1957). 
9. See Article 2, Section 2 of the Basic Law of May 23, 1959 of the Federal Republic of Germany; 
Article 32 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic of Dee. 27, 1949; the Declaration of Independence 
of the United States of America; U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV; Article 2a of the Canadian 
Declaration of Rights (8-9, Ellis, II, ch. 44, S.R.C., 1970); Article I of the Charte des Droits et Libertes 
du Quebec (L.Q., ch. 6,1975); and Article 19 of the Quebec Civil Code. See also Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. As to the force of law of this Convention in the 
member-states of the Council of Europe which have ratfied it, see Susterhahn, L'application de la 
convention sur Ie plan du droit interne, in La protection internationale des droits de l'homme dans Ie cadre 
Europeen. ]0 ANNUAIRE DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT ET DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET POUTIQUES DE 
STRASBOURG 303, 304-20 (Paris, Dalloz 1961); LEs DROITS DE L'HOMME EN DROIT INTERNE ET INTERNA-
TIONAL, ACTES DU VE COLLOQUE SUR LA CONVENTION EUROPEENE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, VIENNA 1965 
(Presses Univ. de Bruxelles 1968). 
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accessible to reason and superior to any positive legal order. 10 The human being 
has not always been considered as inviolable and as the holder of a dignity so 
sacred as to render his body sacrosanct. I I The notion itself of man emerging from 
the totality of a cosmogonyl2 and that of the individual asserting himself as an 
entity distinct from the group is, of recent date, linked to the Western experi-
ence. 13 Even more recent is the notion that all human beings are equal in dignity. 
If today it is unthinkable that a newborn child be put to death, abandoned or 
sold, if we are repulsed by the notion of legal slavery, a corporeal chattel to be 
appropriated and sold, if every individual, however diminished, weak or un-
aware he may be, is recognized as a holder of legal rights with eq ual capacity for 
their exercise and enjoyment, then such advances represent a hard-fought and 
constantly-menaced triumph, which is due to the incessant efforts of a civiliza-
tion inspired in the beginning by Judeo-Christian thought, secularized in the 
eighteenth century and given recent universal recognition by international acts 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. 14 
The legal status of the human body is linked to these developments. The 
inviolability of the body and of the person are recent concepts born of the same 
moment, for the body is the person incarnate. 15 Notwithstanding the voluntarist 
and spiritualist conception behind the French Civil Code, superbly ignorant of 
the realities of flesh-and-blood, the body does not perform the role of object to 
the thinking subject's will; our secularized conception of law does not allow us to 
perceive in the body the mortal, inferior envelope of a soul, which directs the 
body in life and would survive beyond its death, according to views which derive 
from religious faith or metaphysical conviction. Man is a physical and psychic 
10. As to the distinction between rights derived from natural law and those derived from positive 
law, and the necessary recognition of the former by the positive legal order, see J. RIVERO, LEs LlBERTi:s 
PUBLIQUES 16, (Paris, P.U.F. 1973) [hereinafter cited as RIVERO]; F. RIGAUX, INTRODUCTION A LA SCIENCE 
DU DROIT 19 (Brussels, Vie Ouvriere 1974). Cf J. DABIN, LE DROIT SUBJECTIF 48-50 (Paris, Dalloz 1952) 
[hereinafter cited as DABIN]; and J. RENAULD, Reflexions sur /a nature des droits de l'homme, REVUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARE 149, 150-67 (1968). 
II. See Dekkers, Le corps humain et Ie droit, aspects philosophiques, in 26 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION 
HENRI CAPITANT 1,2-3 (1975). 
12. See, e.g., the conception of the individual being in the Brahman and Buddhist religious. In 
contrast, Christianity, by emphasizing man's individual dignity, encouraged the flowering of individ-
ualist philosophy in the West without, however, expecting its subsequent evolution. See M. W ALINE, 
L'INDIVIDUALISME ET LE DROIT 35 (Paris, Domat, Montchrestien 1949); RIVERO, supra note 10, at 34-35. 
13. See HOMME, ENCYCLOPEDIA UNIVERSAUS (1968); D. DE ROUGEMONT, L'AVENTURE OCCIDENTALE DE 
L'HOMME (Paris 1957); Foucault, L'homme est une invention dont {'archeologie de notre pensee montre aisement /a 
date recente, et peut-etre la fin prochaine, in LES MOTS ET LES CHOSES (Paris 1966). 
14. See RIVERO, supra note 10, at 34-46. 
15. See J. CARBONNIER, I DROIT CIVIL No. 48, at 225, and No. 52, at 235 [hereinafter cited as 
CARBONNIER); P. VISSER T'HOFT, LES ACTES DE DISPOSITION CONCERNANT LE CORPS HUMAIN 87. (Archives 
Philosophiq ues de Droit 1979). See also R. Nerson, Les Droits extra-patrimoniaux Nos. 68-70 (1939) 
(thesis) [hereinafter cited as Nerson]. 
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entity forming an inseparable whole. The essential point is that the dualism of 
subject-object does not apply to man. 
Just as man is a unified whole and his person is inviolable, so too the human 
body is protected, at least insofar as the person is alive and such existence is 
legally recognized, since life alone does not suffice for purposes of such recogni-
tion. These boundaries between life and death form the eternal problem which 
arises in the very definition of "person," marking the beginning and the end of 
the legal personality.16 After death, the body, to the extent that death has been 
desanctified,17 is nothing more than the memory of a person, worthy of respect 
but without the same invioability.IH The initial consequence flowing from these 
premises is that of the fundamental noli me tangere, which ideally preserves man 
from all exterior aggression against his life or his integrity, 19 both a priori - the 
person must consent to any compromise of his integrity, at least in private 
matters, and in matters regulated under public law any compromise without 
consent must be as minimal as possible20 - and a posteriori - by dint of criminal 
sanctions and civil recovery for bodily harm, in the form of monetary and moral 
sanctions. 21 This aspect of the individual right to life, bodily integrity, security 
and physical liberty, in opposition both to the state 22 and to private individuals, 
arises in the form of an essentially negative duty - the duty to refrain from 
assault23 - and finds expression both in the rules of private and public law. 24 
From this alone, however, nothing indicates that a person may not exercise 
total domination over himself, northat the principle of corporeal inviolability need 
impose any restrictions on the autonomy of his will. On the contrary, one can 
16. See Meulders-Klein, Corps human in, personnalile juridique el famille en droil beige, in 26 TRAvAux DE 
L'ASSOCIATlON HENRI CAPITANT 19, 20-56 (1975); CARBONNIER, supra note 15, at Nos. 49, 50. 
17. See MORT, LES SOCIETES DEVANT LA MORT - SUR L'EVOLVTION DU SENS DE LA MORT EN OCCIDENT, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA UNIVERSAUS; P. ARIES, ESSAIS SUR L'HISTOIRE DE LA MORT EN OCCIDENT, nu MOYEN-AGE A 
NOS JOURS (Paris, SeuiI1975);]. CHORON, LA MORT ET LA PENSEE OCCIDENTALE (M. Manin, trans., Paris 
1963). 
18. DABIN, supra note 10, at 117; DIERKINS, supra note I, at 131. 
19. CARBONNIER, supra note 15, at 225-27. 
20. Consider, e.g., medical examinations, vaccinations, drug rehabilitation and other treatment. See 
J. Robert (France), F. Mantovani (Italy), R. Kouri and M. Ouelette-Lauzon (Canada) and G. Neu 
(Luxembourg) on The Human Body and Individual Liberty, in 26 TRAvAux DE L'ASSOCIATJON HENRI 
CAPlTANT, 483 et seq. (1975). See also A. DECOCQ, ESSAI D'UNE THEORIE GENERALE DES DROITS SUR LA 
PERSONNE 381 (Paris, L.G.D.]. 1960); DIERKENS, supra note I, at 100-27. 
21. See Savatier, Le dommage el fa personne, 1955 DALLOZ, CHRONIQUE 5; Durry, Sanclion el reparalion des 
atleinles au corps humain, rapporl geniral, 26 TRAvAux DE L'ASSOCIATJON HENRI CAPlTANT 281 (1975). 
22. Practically speaking, the very nature of its opposability against the state itself, combined with 
constitutional guarantees, constitutes the essential victory realized by the declarations of rights in the 
eighteenth century. To impose self-limitation upon the public authorities themselves was infinitely more 
difficult. See The Declaration of Independence of the United States of 1776 and the Preamble to the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789. 
23. More and more often, however, these negative rights tend to be accompanied by a positive right 
to receive at state expense, for example, the "right to health," "to work" and generally the economic, 
social and cultural rights, although the substance of these latter rights remains relatively fluid and 
indeterminate. See RIVERO, surpa note 10, at 100. 
24. These concern guarantees of constitutional law, penal law and judicial law. 
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argue that the human body, so much a property of the person, is under the 
complete and supreme control of that person,25 and further, that his liberty to 
exercise the power of self-determination on himself26 should be plenary in this 
most intimate sphere of his life. Neither the French nor Belgian Penal Code27 
nor the Civil Code2R expressly takes a contrary position. Must one conclude from 
this fact that the consent requisite to every physical assault is therefore sufficient 
and that an unconditional right thus exists to self-determination over one's body, 
similar to the proprietary right to dispose of one's chattel? The answer to this 
double question is obviously in the negative. Belgian and French doctrine have 
asserted for many years that the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" is no longer 
appropriate in a public criminal system29 and that the consent of the victim 
generally does not vitiate an illegal act. 30 Civil law specialists maintain further 
that the human body is "not for sale" and cannot be viably subject to alienation or 
made the object of treaty conventions. 3 ! At this point, it is appropriate to pause 
and examine the objective in rendering self-alienation illegal. 
25. See DABIN, supra note 10, at 105: "Le droit subjectif est une prerogative, concedee it une personne 
par Ie droit objectif et garantie par des voies de droit, de disposer en maitre d'un bien qui est reconnu lui 
appartenir, soit (omme sien, soit (omme du," 
26. RIVERO, supra note 10, at 14-15. 
2 7. With certain exceptions, notably in the matter of mutilations. See infra note 34 and accompanying 
text. 
28. The question is one of the more important ones regarding whether "personal rights," and more 
particularly, rights relating to the human body, are true subjective rights, including a complete 
dominion and right of alienation, or rather 'judicially protected interests." On this point compare 
Nerson, supra note 15, and P. ROUBIER, DROITS SUBJECTIFS ET SITUATIONS JURI DIQUES 72-73, 364-65 
(Paris, Dalloz 1963) who see in "personal rights" (droits de la personalite) juridically protected interests, 
with the thesis of DABIN, supra note 10, at 169, who sees in them true subjective rights but with some 
limitations with regard to the right of alienation (or the power of disposition). See also Dabin, Droit 
subjectif et prerogatives juridiques (Examination of P. Roubier, Academie Royale de Belgique, 
Memoire pour la Classe des Lettres et Sciences Morales et Politiques 1960) (thesis). As to the nature of 
"personal rights" in private French law, see Nerson, La protection de la personalite en droit prive fraru;ais, 13 
TRAVAUX DE L' ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT 61, 62-83 (1963); Kayser, Les droiis de fa personnalite, aspects 
tMoriques et practiques, 1971 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 445-509; Tallon, Personnalite, EN-
CYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ; CARBONNIER, supra note 15, at 342-44. 
Without broaching here the controversy regarding the very definition of "subjective rights," it will 
suffice to note that, whatever be their nature, personal rights, which most authors view to include the 
right to life, physical integrity and the free exercise of human pursuits, belong to a special category, 
whose restrictions relative to the power of disposition or of alienation are all the more strict when the 
property or the rights concerned are closely linked with the person himself. See I MARTY & RAYNAUD, 
DROIT CIVIL Nos. 144, 145 (1972) and vol. 2, Nos. 6 and 7 [hereinafter cited as MARTY & RAYNAUD]; 
WEILL & TERRE, LEs PERSONNES, LA FAMILLE, LES INCAPACITES, DROIT CIVIL Nos. 26-29, 35-36 [hereinaf-
ter cited as WEILL & TERRE]; CARBONNIER, supra note 15, at 327-28; DABIN, supra note 10 at 174-75; 
Tallon, Personnalire, No. 139, ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ. 
29. As to the origin of the maxim volenti non fit injuria and its application in Roman law, see 2 
R. MONIER, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN II (Paris, Domat-Montchrestien 1948); Doublier, Le 
consentement de la victime, in QUELQUES ASPECTS DE L'AUTOMONIE DE DROIT PENAL 188-225 (Paris, Dalloz 
1956) [hereinafter cited as Doublier]; A. FAHMI-ABDOU, LE CONSENTEMENT DE LA VICTIME No.2 (Paris, 
L.G.DJ. 1971) [hereinafter cited as FAHMI-ABDOU]. 
30. See note 39 and accompanying text infra. 
31. See note 84 and accompanying text infra. 
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A. Limitations on the Autonomy of the Individual under Criminal Law 
The principle that the consent of the victim cannot excuse an offense IS not 
absolute, even in the area of criminal law. The exceptions to the rule delimit in a 
more or less precise manner the boundary separating the field of action reserved 
to the control of public authorities and the province reserved to the freedom and 
discretion of the individ ual.32 The author would first like to note that, in the 
majority of cases, acts of self-inflicted injuries and abuse, by the lone individual 
or with the participation of third parties, do not give rise to criminal penalties on 
the part of the victim. Such acts include those of suicide, or its attempt,33 
32. Most foreign penal codes, following the example of the French and Belgian Penal Codes, do not 
provide any general clause recognizing the consent of the victim as grounds for justification. The role of 
such consent plays a part only in particular cases. See FAHMI-ABDOU, supra note 29, at Nos. 3-4. 
Article 50 of the Italian Penal Code appears to be an exception in this matter. With certain exceptions, 
French and Belgian doctrine treat this question but sporadically except for the thesis of Fahmi-Abdou 
(supra note 29). See, e.g., in France: 2 R. GARRAUD, DROIT PENAL GENERAL 65 (1914); VIDAL, COURS DE 
DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE SCIENCES PENITENTIAIRES No. 232 et seq. (Paris 1935); DONNEDIEU DE V ABRES, 
TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CRIMINEL ET DE LEGISLATION PENALE COMPAREE No. 417 (Paris 1943); 1 
BOl'ZAT & PINATEL, TRAITI' DE DROIT PENALET DE CRIMINOWGIE No. 301 (Paris, Dalloz 1970) [hereinafter 
cited as BOUZAT & PINATEL]; 1 MERLE & VITU, TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 539 (Paris, Cujas) [hereinafter 
cited as MERLE & VlTu]; G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR, & B. BOULoc, DROIT PENAL GENERAL, No. 351 
(Precis Dalloz 1980) [hereinafter cited as STEFANI]. These latter indicate that the definitive preliminary 
study to the French Code Penal of 1978 did not retain the victim's consent as a general ground for 
justification "because of the dangerous extension which might possibly be given to a disposition of this 
nature." See Avant-projet di?finitif, at 45. The same reason has arisen in foreign law. In Belgium, see 1 J.J. 
HAl'S. PRINCIPES DE DROIT PENAL, Nos. 603-08 (reprint, Swinnen, Brussels 1977); TROUSSE, supra note 8, 
at Nos. 2729 et seq; CONSTANT, MANUEL DE DROIT PENAL, 1st part., No. 222. (5th ed.). 
Among the articles treating the question, see especially Magnol, Le consentement dR la victime dans Ie detit 
de coup, e/ blessures volontaires, 1937 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT CRIMINEL COMPARE 680; 
Hemard, Le consentement dR la victime dans Ie di?liJ dR coups et blessures, 1939 REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION 
ET DEJ"'RISPRUDENCE 293, 293-319; Garraud, Le role dR la volante du patient et du midRcin grant au traitement 
medical, 1926 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT 129. In Belgium see Simon,Le consentement dR la victime justifie-t-il 
It,s IRsions corporelles?, 1951-52 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 323,323-42. 
Under continental European law, Italian and German doctrine appear to have devoted deeper study 
to this problem in the sphere of a general theory of law. See the numerous references cited by 
FAIiMI-ABDOU, supra note 29, at No.5; see also GRISPIGNI, IL CONSENSO DELL'OFFESO (Rome 1924). 
Anglo-American law has touched upon the problem only incidentally in studies on theories of defense, 
without clearly distinguishing between excuse or privilege, and true justification. See Eser,justification 
and Excuse, 24 AM J. COMPo L. 621 (1976). For English law, see SMITH & HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 397, 397-412 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SMITH & HOGAN]; CROSS & JONES, 
INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW §§ 3-7, 7-2, 7-6, 7-10, 8-29, 9-2, 9-3, 9-9, 9-10 (9th ed. 1980) 
[hereinafter cited as CROSS & JONES]' For American law, see Beale, Consent in the Criminal Law, 8 HARV. L. 
REv. 317 (1895); R. M. PERKINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw 623 (2d ed. 1959); J. HALL, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 14,233 et seq. (2d ed. 1960); Rubinstein, The Victim's Consent in 
Criminal Law: An Essay on the Extent of the Decriminalizing Element of the Crime Concept, in STUDIES IN 
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAw 189-210 (Wise & Muellereds. 1975); P. E.JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAw 743-47 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON]' For Canadian law, see M. Somerville, Le consentement a l'acte 
medical, (Commission de RHorme du Droit du Canada 119, (Document d'Etude, Serie Protection de la 
Vie (1980) [hereinafter cited as Somerville]; Le traitement medical et Ie droit criminel, Commission de 
Reforme du Droit du Canada, 14-16,42, Document de Travail No. 26 (1980). 
As to Scandinavian law, see ANCEL & STRAHL, Le droiJ penal dRs pays Scandinaves, in LES GRANDS 
SYSTEMES DE DROIT PENAL CONTEMPORAINS 36-38 (L'Epargne 1969); Andenaes, Criminal Law of Norway, 
in THE COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAw PROJECT, 173-86 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Andenaes]. 
33. Great Britain has been one of the last European countries to abolish suicide as a crime as well as 
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voluntary self-mutilation, self-intoxication, reckless or negligent behavior 
hazardous to the health and life of the perpetrator and even prostitution. 34 
However, it would be going perhaps too far to conclude that a veritable 
subjective right of self-alienation exists. Technical reasons, criminal policy or 
other factual grounds may explain the non-intervention of the law in this area in 
a given era. 35 On the other hand, certain legislation has sought to outlaw acts of 
self-inflicted mutilations36 or the deliberate suppression of procreative func-
tions. 37 Furthermore, the impunity which certain acts may enjoy is not conclusive 
of legitimacy or legal acceptance,38 even more so in that the consent of the victim 
does not generally relieve third parties of criminal liability. 
l. European Jurisprudence and Statutory Codification 
French and Belgianjurisprudence have been particularly severe in this area of 
the law. They have never allowed the consent of the victim to justify a criminal 
its attempt, in the Suicide Act of 1961. See SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 32, at 346-47. In Canada. 
attempted suicide did not cease to be against the law until the repeal of Article 225 of the Criminal Code 
of 1972 (S.C. 1972, ch. 13, art. 16). See MAYRAND, supra note I. Nonetheless, Article 443 of the Criminal 
Code authorizes peace officers to arrest those who attempt suicide. See Kouri & Ouelette-Lauzon, Le 
corps humain et la liberte individuelle en droit canadien, 26 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT 445 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Kouri]. On the history of the repression of suicide, see Dumont, La repressiun 
du suicide, 1959-1960 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 547-70 [hereinafter cited as Dumont]; Rateau, Le suicide et 
sa reglementation penale, 1962 REVUE INT'L. CRIM. POL. TECH. No.4. 
34. See reports represented by J. Robert of France, R. Kouri and M. Ouelette-Lauzon of Canada, 
F. Mantovani of Italy, and G. Neu of Luxemburg on the human body and individual freedom, in 26 
TRAvAux DE L'ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT 423-512 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mantovani]. 
35. For reasons behind the decriminalization of suicide and attempted suicide, see Dumont, supra 
note 33, at 568-69 and authors cited therein. As to the decriminalization of acts of self-inflicted injury, 
the argument of certain authors such as Fahmi-Abdou that the same person cannot be at the same time 
both active and passive with respect to a crime is not persuasive, for it theorizes that criminal law aims 
only at protecting individual rather than collective interests. This is not the case. In the opinion of the 
present author, this is a question of criminal policy, influenced essentially by the degree of gravity of the 
act in itself and harm done to the collectivity. Once beyond a certain threshold, the principle of 
autonomy prevails. See on this subject the interesting distinction formulated by Mantovani, supra note 
34, at 486, between acts to the detriment of the health of the person, acts to the detriment of the health 
of the person and third parties, acts to the benefit of the health of the person and acts to the exclusive 
benefit of third persons. 
36. See, in France, Article 87, paragraph I ofthe Law of Mar. 31, 1928, and Articles 398 to 400 of the 
Code of Military Justice; in Belgium, Law of Nov. 13, 1915 to the Military Penal Code as to voluntary 
mutilation, and Article 96 ofthe Law of June 15, 1951; in Italy, Articles 157., 158 and 161 of the Military 
Code of Peace, Articles 112, paragraphs 2 and 115 of the Military Code of War and Article 642 of the 
Penal Code (fraudulent mutilation); in Spain, Article 426 of the Penal Code; in Switzerland, Article 95 
of the Military Penal Code; in Norway, Article 134 of the Penal Code. As to the common law crime of 
"mayhem," see Bravenec, Sterilization as a Grime - Applicability of Assault and Battery and of Mayhem, 6 J. 
FAM. L. 94-128 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bravenac], especially page 117. Fraudulent mutilation can 
fall under other headings, such as insurance fraud. For a case of this type see State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 
120 S.E. 2d 580 (1961), cited by Bravenec, supra, at 122. 
37. Italian Penal Code, art. 552, repealed by the Law of May 22, 1978 on abortion; Turkish Penal 
Code, art. 471. 
38. See Gimanovitch, Le suicide est-il un droit de l'homme?, 1957 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 
407. 
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offense, at least where the affected right is not alienable. 39 Because the body is by 
principle inviolable, and no individual may derogate expressly from this princi-
ple, the consent of the victim constitutes neither a ground for justification nor a 
special ground for leniency or exoneration in matters of criminal assault. 40 
In activities where consent appears to justify flagrant intrusions on physical 
integrity, such as medical operations and violent sports, doctrine and jurispru-
dence traditionally invoke other theories of justification such as permission or 
favor of law and necessity,41 which necessarily imply limitations. Consent, while 
necessary, is never alone sufficient. Moreover, under no circumstances is legal 
action left to the exclusive initiative of the victim. Consent of the victim can at 
best be a mitigating circumstance which judicial discretion might take into 
consideration, 42 just as the court has power to weigh the motive of the accused,43 
or just as the public attorney can choose not to pursue the case, at least if the 
gravity of the act so permits. 44 
In the context of bodily assault, other laws, however, offer the victim relatively 
greater discretion in the exercise of his will. The range of offenses which give 
rise to legal process only if the victim lodges a complaint (delit de plainte), or only 
if that complaint has not been withdrawn by the victim (retrait de plainte), followed 
by any attenuating affirmative defenses or even privilege or exoneration based 
on the victim's consent proceeds along a scale marked by subtle gradations. By 
way of example, under certain foreign laws, criminal prosecution for physical 
assault can only take place after the victim has lodged a complaint. Such laws 
create a distinction between minor breach of the peace followed by blows which 
do not produce injury, on the one hand, and violence resulting in damage, which 
is always automatically subject to arrest and prosecution, on the other hand, 
39. This hypothesis lacks an essential element. Such is generally the case in the area of offenses 
relative to property, freedom and morals, except when the law explicitly does away with the effect of 
consent. See French Penal Code arts. 332 and 334-35; Belgian Penal Code arts. 372,372 bis, 375, 379, 
380 bis 1 as to solicitation and sexual offenses against minors. 
See STEFANI, supra note 32, at No. 359; MERLE & VITU, supra note 32, at No. 424; BOUZAT & PINATEL, 
supra note 32, at 303; DOUBLIER, supra note 29, at No. 11; TROUSSE, supra note 8, at No. 2733. 
40. BOUZAT & PINATEL, supra note 32, at Nos. 302, 305-07; STEFANI, supra note 32, at No. 357; 
TROUSSE. supra note 8, at No. 2734; Casso Fr., july I, 1937, [1938] Sirey, I, 193, Note Tortat (the 
so-called case of the slerilisateurs de Bordeawe). As to duels, see Casso Fr., ch. Reunies, june 22, 1837, 
[1837] Sirey I, 465; Casso Fr. Crim., Dec. 15, 1837, [1838] Sirey I, 5. In Belgium, see Articles 423 et seq. 
of the Penal Code. 
41. As to sports, see BOUZAT & PINATEL, supra note 32, at No. 308; TROUSSE, supra note 8, at No. 2752; 
Charles, Le sporl el La loi penale, 1952-1953 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL, 860; Constant, Droil penal el sporl, 1917 
REVUE DE DROIT PENAL. Cf FAHMI-ABDOU, supra note 29, at No. 285-92. 
42. Art. 79, Belgian Penal Code art. 79; Casso B., Nov. 10, 1952, [1953] Pas.1 147. 
43. In neither French nor Belgian law does motive, as opposed to criminal intention, constitute a 
justifying factor, with exceptions provided by law. See MERLE & VITU, supra note 32, at No. 387; BOUZAT 
& PINATEL, supra note 32, at Nos. 172-74; STEFANI, supra note 32, at Nos. 217-22; TROUSSE, supra note 8, 
at Nos. 2582-2604; Tahon, Le mobile en droil penal beige, 1948-1949 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 109. See also 
Trousse, Le mobile juslificalif, 1962-1963 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 418. Compare English law on the 
irrelevance of motive as opposed to intent: See CROSS & JONES, supra note 32, at § 3-33. 
44. See Glesener, Le classemenl sans suile el l'opporlunite des poursuiles, 1972-73 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 
353-62. 
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albeit along a scale of severity corresponding to the gravity of the injuries. Such is 
the case in Italy:" Switzerland,46 Norway,47 Denmark,48 Sweden,49 Finland,50 
and in the Federal Republic of Germany."J The situation in which the victim 
himself presses charges (delit de plainte) is distinguishable from the case in which 
the victim was consenting at the moment of the assault, in that the former, rather 
than presuming consent, allows the victim a posteriori to drop charges. Also 
different is the situation in which lack of consent is a constituent element of the 
offense, insofar as the act is criminal in an objective sense once the requisite 
elements of the offense, as defined by the criminal code, are present, whether or 
not the victim has consented.52 Nonetheless, to the extent that the act concerns a 
minor breach or leads to minor injury, public prosecution generally gives way to 
a private cause of action, absent overriding considerations of public policy. 
More precisely, consent of the victim sometimes may work to either mitigate or 
remove the penalty, if not to exclude altogether the existence of any breach on 
grounds of privilege. It is thus that the Danish Penal Code allows the judge to 
reduce the applicable penalty for assault and battery not resulting in death, as 
well as to remove any penalty for breach of peace, if the victim had consented to 
the crime.53 The Norwegian Penal Code provides that the penalties for breach of 
the peace and battery, which do not result in serious physical damage, are not 
applicable if the victim was consenting. Where serious injury has occurred, the 
penalty may be reduced below the legal minimum or commuted.54 Norwegian 
doctrine seems to represent the view that, although the law speaks in terms of 
impunity, consent renders the act permissible, and hence justifiable.55 
Similarly, the German56 and Austrian"7 Penal Codes provide explicitly that 
bodily injury (Kiiperoerletzung) inflicted with the consent of the victim is not illegal 
(rechtswidrig) unless the act is contrary to social morals, without making any 
distinction as to gravity of the injury. This represents an almost inverted process 
in the determination of what constitutes impermissible behavior, in that physical 
assault upon the integrity of another, done with his consent, appears permissible 
45. Italian Penal Code arts. 581-82. 
46. Swiss Penal Code arts. 123, 125, 126. 
47. Norwegian Penal Code arts. 228, para. 4, and 229, para. 2. 
48. Danish Penal Code arts. 244, 5, and 249, I. 
49. Swedish Penal Code part II, ch. 3, art. II, paras. 2 and 3. 
50. Finn Penal Code ch. XXI, art. 14. 
51. Strafgesetzbuch section 232. 
52. See Andenaes, supra note 32, at 174-75. 
53. See I Danish Penal Code art. 248. 
54. Norwegian Penal Code art. 235. 
55. See Andenaes, supra note 32, at 177-80. Section 235 applies to duels as well. 
56. Strafgesetzbuch section 226a. 
57. Strafgesetzbuch section 90. Since 1949, paragraph 2 of section 90 legalizes voluntary sterilization 
(non-therapeutic) performed by a physician upon a person over the age of 25, or provided that other 
reasons exist which are not contrary to moral standards. BGB I 92/1949, IXg 3/ I. The paragraph allows 
medical operations not having therapeutic ends, such as plastic surgery. and scientific experimentation. 
See 5 HEINL, LOCHENSTEIN, VEROSTA, Strafrechl, DAS OSTERREJCHJSCHE RECHT § 90, notes 6 and 9 
[hereinafter cited as HEJNL]. 
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provided the act does not run counter to the prevailing social standards of 
morality in the community. It is thus the province of the judge to evaluate what 
the social consciousness demands.58 The Greek Penal Code does not go as far, in 
that it exonerates acts resulting in minor injuries upon a consenting party, but 
not those creating dangerous or serious injury. The Swiss Penal Code is silent 
concerning these matters. 59 However, Swiss doctrine recognizes the existence of 
extra-legal privileges. On this level, the consent of the victim may have an 
effective role to play, but only as to minor bodily injury and only insofar as 
judicial discretion permits.60 
The Italian Penal Code is the only one to contain a general provision under 
which a person who harms or compromises an alienable right of another person 
with that person's consent is not criminally liable. This provision apparently has 
been held to confer a privilege excusing the offense rather than a mere immu-
nity from prosecution,61 The Italian Penal Code does not, however, indicate if 
and when a person can compromise his physical integrity. Article 5 of the Civil 
Code, on the other hand, provides that a person may not engage in acts which 
cause a permanent diminution of his physical integrity or which are otherwise 
contrary to law, public order or community morals. From this derives that part 
of the modern doctrine that holds willing acts of bodily assault fall within the 
scope of Article 50 of the Penal Code when such acts are not sufficiently serious. 
Here again, judicial discretion plays a role.62 Of course, any consent must be 
genuine, that is, conscious, knowing and free from untoward or fraudulent 
intention,63 and not otherwise barred by law. 64 
2. The Anglo-American Experience 
The Anglo-American approach, viewed in the context of its historic social and 
philosophical attitude toward an individualistic liberalism less worried about 
58. This approach is somewhat similar to that present in Anglo-American law in that it appears to 
first posit the principle of self-determination, subject to the demands of public order and decency, these 
two concepts being themselves susceptible of developing as a function of public policy. See H. H. 
JESCHECK, U:HRBUCH DES STRAFSRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TElL § 34, at 246-52 [hereinafter cited as 
JESCHECK], according to which, under general theory, the role accorded the consent of the victim 
(Einwilligung) stems from judicial policy and the importance given individual liberty as a social value. 
However, the German and Austrian laws as formulated appear to go further than the common law has 
gone, as evidenced by the latter's jurisprudence. 
59. P. NOLL, Ubergesetzliclu! Rechtsfertigungsgriinde im besonders die Einwilligung des Verletzten, in 10 
SCHWEIZERISCHE CRIMINALlSTISCHE STUDIEN (Bale 1955); I H. SCHULTZ, EINFUHRUNG IN DEN 
ALLGEMEINEN TElL DES STRAFRECHTS 153 at § 12 III i (Bern 1977). 
60. P. LOGoz, COMMENTAIRE DU CODE PENAL SUISSE, Partie Generale, arts. I to 110, 166-67 (2d ed. 
Neufchatel 1976). 
61. Italian Penal Code art. 50. See also Indian Penal Code § 88 (Central Law Agency 1963). 
62. FAHMI-ABDOU, supra note 29, at 386-97 and references cited therein. 
63. Every doctrinal work has insisted on these conditions. Consent must always precede or coincide 
with the act. As to the requisite capacity, the predominating view is that consent, being a manifestation 
of will and not a legal act, requires the capacity of discernment and not legal capacity. 
64. As to solicitation and protecting minors against crimes against morality, see note 39 supra. 
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protecting the individual against himself than as against his fellows, may appear 
a priori to be the converse, to the extent that it seems to place the principle of 
self-determination in the forefront. 65 However, Anglo-American jurisprudence 
and doctrine lead to results which are not palpably unlike those mentioned 
above, in that considerations of public order, interest and social morals necessar-
ily limit individual autonomy. Society thus recognizes that, beyond a certain 
threshold, which is susceptible to fluctuation, the harm which an individual can 
cause himself is liable to produce harm to the social collective itself. Here, 
utilitarianism corrects the potential excesses of liberalism. Thus, in the area of 
assault and battery, consent of the victim is only admissible as grounds for 
defense to the extent that the offense does not compromise the public interest or 
order and that its degree of seriousness does not exceed the limitations fixed by 
case law.66 
In Great Britain, these limitations have been discussed in the 1934 case of R. v. 
Donovan to the effect that no one may consent to the infliction of bodily harm, 
which is defined as any wound or any injury which diminishes a person's health 
or well-being in a serious, although not necessarily permanent, manner.67 A 
more recent decision in 1954, Bravery v. Bravery, 68 regarding voluntary steriliza-
tion, invoked the ruling from an 1882 case, Queen v. Coney, 69 in which it was held 
that a wound must be as harmful to the public as it is to the victim. The court 
found that voluntary sterilization did not cause such harm.70 In this context, 
situations involving medical operations have remained unclear. 71 
In the United States, consent does not deprive an act of its anti-social character 
if the act constitutes a breach of the peace, violates other laws, involves mayhem 
or causes serious bodily harm. 72 The Model Penal Code of 1962 in Section 2.11 
65. For a comparison between the attitudes of common law and civil law countries, see Somerville, 
supra note 32, at 3-10. For the same reason Anglo-American countries accept more readily that a free 
and responsible individual may submit himself voluntarily to non-therapeutic experimentations if they 
serve a common good. 
On the other hand, an old principle of common law provides that no one is under a duty to come to 
the aid of another unless he has committed himself to so do. TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAw 19 (19th ed. 1966), cited in Le traitement medical et Ie droit criminel 29 n.121 (Commis-
sion de RHorme du Droit du Canada, Doc. Trav. No. 26). 
66. Beale, Consent in the Criminal Law, 18 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1895). Cf Indian Penal Code § 66. 
67. R. v. Donovan, Court of Criminal Appeal, [1934] All E. R. 207 (consent to voluntary sexual 
flagellation); SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 32, at 407-10; CROSS & JONES, supra note 32, at § 7-2. 
68. Bravery v. Bravery [1954] 3 All E. R. 59 (civil suit in which a wife sued for divorce on the ground 
that her husband underwent sterilization without any medical reason). 
69. Queen v. Correy, [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 534, 549 Uudge Steven). 
70. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Lord Judge Denning. 
For arguments in favor of expanding the scope of consent as a means of defense, see G. WILLIAMS, 
THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 74, 75-111 (1957); Hughes, Two Views on Consent in the 
Criminal Law, MOD. L. R. 233 (1963); G. Williams, Consent and Public Policy, CRIM. L. REv. 154 (1962). 
71. As to sterilization, see note 146 and accompanying text infra. 
72. See Bravenec, supra note 36, at 98 and 117 and cases cited therein; WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE § 180 (12th ed. 1957); CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES §§ 143,218 (5th ed. 1952). 
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takes up this latter point with respect to consent to bodily injury.73 In Canada, 
the situation appears to be somewhat different to the extent that, under Article 
244 of the Criminal Code, the absence of consent is a constituent element of 
assault and battery. Determining when an act exceeds consent, for example, in 
the area of sports, can be difficult. 74 However, in Article 288 of the Criminal 
Code, relative to intentional bodily harm having as an objective the injury, 
mutilation or disfiguration of a person, absence of consent is not a constitutent 
element. Furthermore, "intent" need only be of the willful and wanton type, and 
not intent to harm. It is thus far from certain whether consent alone could suffice 
as a defense in the absence of other types of justification, such as necessity.75 
Speaking generally, it is thus apparent that the legislature or the courts leave 
the initiative to the victim, who may pursue civil remedies, if his consent is 
lacking, or who may consent to a compromise of his bodily integrity to the extent 
the harm is not excessive and the public interest or moral standards are not 
seriously threatened. Of course, the dictates of public interest and moral stan-
dards are themselves susceptible to evolution. Consent can never serve, a 
fortiori, as justifiable grounds for homicide requested by the victim or with his 
consent, nor as exemption from penalty. At most, it might result in a lighter 
sentence. 76 Significantly, most countries, unlike Belgium and France, treat aid-
73. See JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 746. 
74. See also Quebec Civil Code art. 20. 
75. See Le traitement medical et Ie droit criminel, supra note 32, 29 et seq. Somerville, supra note 32, 
at 47-48, 119-25. 
76. France and Belgium have no special provisions relative to homicide committed at the request or 
with the consent of the victim, or in the form of a mercy killing committed without request or consent. 
Such are thus considered as murder unless the actor was in a state of insanity or under the influence of 
an irresistible force. However, attenuating circumstances may reduce the sentence, and the jury, often 
moved by pity, might decide for acquittal. In France, see MERLE & VITU, supra note 32, at No. 425; 
BOUZAT & PINATEL, supra note 32, at No. 306; M.L. RASSAT, DROIT PENAL SPECIAL Nos. 147 and 150 
(Precis Dalloz 1975); Toulouse, Aug. 9, 1973, [1974] Dalloz 452; Rateau, L'euthanas~ et sa regiementation 
penak, [1964] Sirey, Chronique 30; and Sirey, REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 38 (1964). In Belgium,see HAUS, 
PRINCIPLES DU DROIT PENAL, Vol. I. No. 606; TROUSSE, supra note 8, at Nos. 2596 and 2735; Tahon, Le 
consentement de La victime, 1951-1952 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 330; Trousse, L'ortlwthanas~ par omission de 
secours, 1950-51 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 1102. Belgian doctrine, as opposed to French, accepts the 
possibility of homicide by omission. 
Among those foreign laws which expressly provide for attentuating circumstances, most require the 
victim's immediate and serious request that he be put to death. Swiss Penal Code art. 114; German Penal 
Code § 216; Austrian Penal Code § 139; Danish Penal Code art. 239; Finn Penal Code ch. XXI., art. 3; 
Greek Penal Code art. 300; Netherlands Penal Code art. 293. The Italian Penal Code in Article 579 
makes express reference to homicide by consent. The Norwegian Penal Code in Article 235 and Polish 
Penal Code in Article 227 provide for homicide out of mercy. On the other hand, the Soviet Penal Code, 
after accepting total immunity for murder by consent or out of compassion in 1922, has since reverted 
to a position similar to the French approach. For the different laws see FAHMI-ABDOU, supra note 29, at 
337-41. 
In Anglo-American countries, although opinion seems to lean more favorably towards euthanasia, 
consent can be no defense. See, for English law, CROSS & JONES, supra note 32, at § 7-2, at 114: "However 
excellent his motive may be, someone who kills another at that other's request is guilty of murder, unless 
he acted in pursuance of a suicide pact, in which case his offense is manslaughter." Homicide Act of 
1957 § 4(2). For American law, see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 86, 87 (2d ed. 1960); 
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ing and abetting suicide as a crime sui generis. 77 This position finds support with 
the Ordres des Medecins 7M (European medical associations with disciplinary powers) 
and in Recommendation No. 779 of 1976 adopted by the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe, affirming that a physician has the duty to strive to 
alleviate suffering, but does not have the right to intentionally hasten the process 
of death. 79 
Finally, the case where absence of consent constitutes an element of the crime 
itself deserves separate treatment and should be distinguished clearly from the 
preceding examples,80 because at issue here is less the scope of culpable activity 
by a third party and more the freedom of action of the potential victim. For 
example, the criminalization of rape and crimes against decency81 concerns less 
the protection of the body or the decency of the person than his freedom to 
consent to such an act. It is, therefore, the entire area of sexual freedom itself, 
and hence the right to employ the body in sexual activities, which is defined by 
such laws. One must conclude that this area is largely left unaddressed in Belgian 
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 86 (1969); Moore, The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia, 1972-1973 UMKC L. REV. 
327, 329-40. In Canada, Article 14 of the Criminal Code provides that no one may consent to his own 
murder and that any consent does not vitiate criminal liability. See also Danielus, A Survey of the 
jurisprudence Concerning the Rights ProtecUd by the European Convention of Human Rights, 1975 REVUE DE 
DROIT DE L'HOMME 431. 
77. In France and Belgium suicide is not criminal, nor is aiding the victim to commit suicide. 
Assisting someone to commit suicide is not punishable since suicide itself is not an offense. Article 63 of 
the French Penal Code and 422 bis of the Belgian Penal Code are partially applicable. But see the 
decision of the Criminal Chamber of the French Courde Cassation of Apr. 27,1971, (1971) Bull. Crim. 
No. 116 at 301, which has ruled that the first paragraph of Article 63 of the Penal Code is not applicable 
to suicide. 
Most other jurisdictions criminalize the instigation or aiding of suicide. See Austrian Penal Code art. 
139b; Swiss Penal Code art. 115; Danish Penal Code art. 240; Norwegian Penal Code art. 236; 
Netherlands Penal Code art. 294;, Italian Penal Code art. 580; Greek Penal Code art. 301; Soviet Penal 
Code art. 107. See also FAHMI-ABDOU, supra note 29, at 302-06. In English law, see the Suicide Act of 
1961, § 2(2); CROSS & JONES, supra note 32, §§ 8-20, at 152. 
78. See the opinion of the Conference Internationale des Ordres des Medecins (Germany, France, 
Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Luxemburg, Ireland, Italy) of Mar. 4, 1976, issued on the Resolu-
tions et Recommandations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, reproduced in 
BULLETIN OFFICIEL DE L'ORDRE DES MEDECINS BELGES, No. 25, (1976-1977). See also the CODE DE DEON-
TOLOGIE MEDICALE FRAN<;AIS, Decret No. 79-506 of june 28, 1979, art. 20; CODE DE DEONTOLOGIE 
MEDICALE BELGE, art. 95-96. 
79. Recommendation 779 (1976) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe relative to 
the rights of the ill and of the dying, point 7. See also the Opinion on the rights of the ill and ofthe dying 
presented in the name of the Commission of Legal Affairs by Mr. de Marco (Doc. 3735, jan. 27, 1976) 
and the Report on the rights of the ill and ofthe dying presented by Ms. Hubinek and Mr. Voogd in the 
name of the Commission on Social Questions and Health (Doc. 3699, jan. 26, 1976). In its entirety, this 
Recommendation, as also Resolution 613 of 1976 adopted by the Assembly on january 29, 1976, rather 
tends to affirm the right of the patient to refuse treatment and to avoid unremitting therapy. 
80. German doctrine distinguishes clearly between agreement (Einverstandnis), the absence of which 
represents a basic element of the offense, and consent (Einwilligung) , which is a justification. See 
jESCHECK, supra note 58, § 34, at 246-47. 
81. Belgian Penal Code arts. 372, 372 bis and 375. 
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law82 since Belgian law tolerates any sexual behavior, be it incestuous, homosex-
ual or "contrary to nature," between consenting and competent adults and even 
adolescents, provided that public mores, freedom and respect for others are 
observed. Along similar lines of thought, the abrogation of laws prohibiting the 
advertisement of contraceptives83 - Belgium never having banned the use or 
sale of contraceptives - shows that the freedom to engage one's body in sexual 
activities, while eliminating the risks of sexual procreation by preventive and 
non-harmful means, is equally condoned. 
In summation, if the criminal laws must be regarded as a measure of the 
threshold of tolerance fixed by society to limit individual autonomy, then 
reflected in those laws is the entire range of liberties enjoyed by individuals, and 
notably the freedom to exercise dominion over one's body. This freedom en-
compasses sexual activities to which consent is freely given and which do not 
compromise standards of public decency or the protection of minors, the right to 
control one's fecundity, at least by preventive means and a certain amount of 
tolerance for the least serious kinds of acts against private and public interests. 
On the contrary, the right to consent to the alienation of one's life, or to serious 
injury effectuated by a third party without the privilege of necessity or permis-
sion of the law, cannot in principle be admitted. 
B. Limitations on the Autonomy of the Individual in the Area of Private Law 
It is well established in the area of civil law in Belgium and France that the 
human body constitutes an object which is not subject to the laws of patrimony. 
The body, not being a chattel, cannot be an object of the law of property or 
usufruct.84 Nor can the body, being outside of commerce, be the object of treaty. 
Although unwritten,85 these principles are so solidly entrenched as to be beyond 
doubt or need of explanation. 86 
Nonetheless, certain clarifications may be in order, for not all laws and treaties 
relative to the human body are necessarily void as contrary to public order and 
mortality. Long ago, after Dean Josserand had denounced in a rather provoca-
82. Belgian and French law on sexual offenses appears to have been for quite awhile more liberal 
than Anglo-American legislation criminalizing fornication, sodomy, and homosexuality. The reaction 
today is even stronger in these countries. 
83. Belgium, Law of July 9, 1973, repealing paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 389 of the Penal Code. 
France, Laws of Dec. 28,1967 and Dec. 4, 1974. 
84. Nerson, supra note 15, at Nos. 68-70; CARBONNIER, supra note 15, at 235,328; MARTY & RAYNAUD, 
supra note 28, at Vol. 2 Nos. 6 and 7; Nerson, L'injllJ£nce de la biologie et de la medecine moderne sur Ie droit 
civil, 1970 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVlL661, 662-83, especially at 680-81; R. SAVATlER, LE DROIT 
DE LA PERSONNE ET L'ECHELLE DES VALEURS 590 (Homage Gothot); DIERKENS, supra note I, at No. 32-40; 
Cf David, Structure de la Personne Humaine: Essai sur la Distinction des Personnes et des Choses 
(Paris, P.U.F. 1955) (thesis). 
85. Neither Articles 6, 1128, 1131 nor 1133 of the Civil Code supports a priori this position, which 
seems to rely rather on a general principle of law which has gone unchallenged until now. 
86. Jack, us conventions relatives Ii la personne phYSUJlJ£, REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET JURISPRU-
DENCE 362-95 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Jack]. 
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tive way the increasingly frequent appearance of the human body in the field of 
contracts,87 a French scholar made a clear distinction between the legality of the 
purpose and the legality of the object of such agreements. 88 We shall go along 
with that distinction, while examining also the differing situations where the 
person is alive or dead. 
It has long been accepted that the dead body can be the object of a voluntary 
disposition,89 in whole or in part, notably by means of gift or legacy - hence, a 
gratuitious transfero - for scientific or therapeutic purposes. Here arises the 
problem of the legality of the purpose. 91 Recent laws governing gifts and trans-
plants of tissue and organs ex mortua expressly provide for this form of generos-
ity.92 The principle questions raised in this regard henceforth concern the 
87. L. Josserand, La personne dans Ie commerce juridique, (1932) Dalloz, Chronique I. 
88. Jack, supra note 86, at 367-95. 
89. Casso B., July 3, 1899, [1899) Pas. I, 318. See also the French Law of November 17, 1887 on the 
freedom to choose the appropriate funeral service. 
90. American opinion appears more uncertain on this matter, questioning the desirability of estab-
lishing a market for organs or bodies. Only Delaware expressly prohibits the sale of cadavers. See 
Dukeminier, Organ Donation, Legal Aspects, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Dukeminier). Cf. Article 14 of the Resolution (78) 29 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on May II, 1978, which excludes profit motive in such transactions. 
91. Matthijs, Considerations en vue d'une loi sur les transplantations, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 74-83, 94-99 
(1972). As to the rights ofthe individual to the body defunct, see DIERKENS, supra note I, at Nos. 265-66; 
P. J. DOLL, LA DISCIPLINE DES GREEFES, DES TRANSPLANTATIONS ET AUTRES ACTF.S DE DISPOSITIONS 
CONCERNANT LE CORPS HUMAIN 139 (Paris, Masson 1970) [hereinafter cited as DOLL)' In Canada, see 
MAYRAND,Supra note I, at 151-75. Naturally, the wishes of the deceased prevail over those ofthe family. 
92. Although older laws governing the removal of human tissues, organs and substances already 
existed, more recent laws have been needed with the advent of artificial support systems, reanimation, 
removal, conservation and transplantation of organs such as the heart. In Denmark, see the Law of June 
of9, 1967, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE d:GISLATION SANITAIRE 803 (1963); in South Africa, the Law No. 
24 of Mar. 3, 1970; in Norway, the Law No.6 of Feb. 9, 1973, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION 
SANITAIRE 404 (1974); in Sweden, the Law No. 190 of May 15,1975, [1975) RECUEILINTERNATIONALDE 
LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 936 (1975); in italy, the Law No. 644 of Dec. 2,1975, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE 
LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 618 (1977) and Decree No. 409 of June 16, 1977, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE 
LEGISLATION SAN ITA IRE 623 (1979). In France, the Law of Dec. 22, 1976 RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL 
LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 341 (1977) and Decree No. 78-501 of Mar. 31, 1978, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE 
LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 74 (1979); in Argentina, the Law No. 21541 of Mar. 31, 1977, RECUEIL 
INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAlRE 774 et seq (1978); in Greece, the Law No. 821 of Oct. 13, 
1978, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 617 et. seq. (1979); in Australia, Ordinance 
No. 44 of Dec. 13, 1978, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 803-04 (1979). The fifty 
states of the United States have all adopted, with certain modifications, the Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act, approved in 1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law. In 
Canada, see Articles 19 to 22 of the Civil Code of Quebec. As to the situation prior to 1970, see 
L'utilisation thirapeutique de tissus humains, apercu de ligislation sanitaire comparee, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL 
DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 3, 4-23 (1969) and accompanying references. In Europe, see Resolution 78 
(29) on the harmonization of comparative health legislation of the member states relative to removals, 
grafts and transplantations of human substances, adopted May 11, 1978 by the Committee of the 
Ministers of the Council of Europe; Ochinsky, Les travaux du conseit de l'Europe dans Ie dOT/Uline du droit de 
la medecine, IT. at 1-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ochinsky). In Belgium, the Law of Feb. 7, 1961 
relative to human therapeutic substances concerns, in spite of its generous title, only blood and its 
derivatives. The government, on Feb. 27, 1981, proposed a bill on the removal of organs and tissues 
from living persons or after death. Doc. ParI., Chambre, Session 1980-1981 No. 774-1. 
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determination of w hat constitutes the exact moment of death, namely, the 
threshold marking the moment the person ceases to exist;93 what technical 
precautions to take in order to avoid abuse;94 and what acts of consent should be 
necessary.95 Indeed, these are fundamental questions of a rare complexity.96 
As to the living body, the initial question is whether it can be viably subject to 
legal acts. Any answer is necessarily colored by the fact that numerous treatises in 
current practice concern the human body, although not human life itself.97 The 
body, therefore, can be regarded as an object of viable juridical acts, even more 
so to the extent that the act governs the use of parts of the body which are easily 
detachable and self-regenerating, or which do not cause harm to itself.98 Thus, 
the objective importance of any action taken with respect to the body is a primary 
criterion by which to evaluate that action. This criterion is, however, insufficient. 
The essential crux of the problem concerns the purpose and legitimacy of any 
93. Although the two problems are related, it is important to separate the attestation of death of a 
person otherwise deceased but whose functions such as circulation and respiration are artificially 
maintained, from the termination of extraordinary treatment. The controversy sUITounding the 
former concerns essentially the following: 1) the necessity of adopting a new definition of death, that of 
brain death, at least in those cases where artificial support is provided; 2) the diagnostic criteria to adopt 
in order to attest to the above; and 3) the opportunity of introducing this definition, or other diagnostic 
criteria, into a legislative enactment. 
94. This involves, for example, the place of removal and the separation of the teams attesting to 
death from those involved with removal and transplantation. 
95. Curiously, although older laws placed the liberal intention of the donor in the form of a gift or 
legacy, (see the French Law of July 7,1949 allowing corneal grafts from the eyes of voluntary donors), 
the recent tendency in Europe is towards a statutory right of removal, based on the presumed consent 
ofthe deceased, absent manifestation to the contrary prior to death. The liberal and voluntary character 
of the act here vanishes in favor of the social good. The same goes for the consent of one's kin, in whom 
remains solely a possible right of disapproval. In that field, the French Law of June 22, 1976, and the 
Decree of Mar. 31, 1978, have been most severely criticized. See Jacquinot, Sur Ie preievements d'organes, 
GAZETTE DU PALAIS 5 (1979). See also Article 8 of the proposed Belgian bill of Feb. 27,1981, Doc. ParI., 
Chambre, No. 774-1. In the United States, on the other hand, as generally in all common law countries, 
the law of donative and testamentary transfers requires a written document or testament made out in 
the presence of witnesses and submitted for acceptance by a beneficiary, such as a physician or 
accredited institution. In addition, the donor or testator must be at least 18 years of age and of sound 
mind. Otherwise, one of the kin, according to geneological order, may give consent following death. 
Nonetheless, the dearth of available organs could well cause the reexamination of this procedure. See 
Dukeminier, supra note 90, at 1158. See also Somerville, supra note 32, at 78. 
96. Remarkably, not all laws authorize indiscriminately just any organ removal, for just any purpose. 
Thus .. the Italian Law of Dec. 2,1975 expressly excludes the removal of the ovaries and gonads, as well 
as the brain. Most of the laws concern exclusively removal in view of transplantation. Certain laws 
include removals and autopsies for scientific purposes; others, for educational reasons. The scope of 
possibilities in this area is limitless. 
97. French jurisprudence and doctrine themselves have buried the notion of contrat mlidical (medical 
contract). See Casso Fr., May 20, 1936,. [1936] Dalloz 88; R. SAVATlER, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABIUTE 
CIVILE Vol. 2 No. 775 et seq. (Paris, Librairie Generale de Droit et Jurisprudence 1951) R. SAVATIER & 
H. PEQUIGNOT, TRAITE DE DROIT MEDICAL, No. 309 [hereinafter cited as SAVATIER & PEQUIGNOT]. In 
Belgium, see 1 R. O. DALCQ, LEs NOVELLES, RESPONSABIUTE CIVILE No. 1001 et seq; 1021 at seq. 
[hereinafter cited as DALCQ]. 
98. See Nerson, L'injluence de La bioLogre et de la medicine sur Ie droit civil, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROIT 
CIVIL 676 (1970). 
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action compromising the bodyY9 It is sometimes necessary to compromise bodily 
integrity in order to save a life or a person's health. In such case, it is necessity or 
utility, the added value or personal benefit, which legitimizes the act,IOO and 
hence justifies medical treatment. Far from hindering medical treatment, such 
compromise corresponds to the common goal of protective intervention. Fur-
thermore, an individual may consent to such compromise as a sacrifice for the 
benefit of the health or life of a third person or for society. Justification is found 
both in altruistic purpose and collaterally in the psychological benefit or moral 
enhancement of the consenting person. Nonetheless, the risk thereby engen-
dered cannot be disproportionate to the benefit designed to devolve onto third 
persons. When the compromise is serious, this benefit can be justified only by 
true necessity.IOI The giving of self-regenerating substances, such as blood, is 
considered enhancing both to the donor and to the recipient,102 whereas the 
giving of an organ ex vivo causing a definitive impairment is acceptable only in 
exceptional cases. 103 Similarly, non-thera peutic ex peri mentation - which to this 
day is not regulated in Belgium - can be regarded as legitimate only to the 
extent that its scientific and indispensable character is recognized, and where the 
accompanying risks are negligible. l04 
99. Jack, supra note 86, at 369 et seq. 
100. /d. at 375-80; DIERKENS, supra note I, at 49-55. 
101. DIERKENS, supra note I, at 56-65; DOLL, supra note 91, at 83 et seq; Doll, L'aspect moral, religieux et 
juridique des transplantations d'organes, [1974] Gazette du Palais 2 et seq; A. De Coninck, P. Dor and J. R. 
Fagnart, Etude sur Ie probleme de la recherche exerimentale sur l'homme et son application aux greffes 
d'organes, Conseil de I'Ordre des Medecins du Brabant d'expression fran~aise (1971); SAVATIER & 
PEQUIGNOT, supra note 97, at No. 276. 
102. The donation of blood is the most classic example. The donation of sperm now seems to be 
recognized as an altruistic act, after being regarded for years with hesitancy. See De Coo man-van Kan, 
L'insemination artificielle, recommandation du Conseit de l'Europe et perspective de reglementation Beige, J. T. 369, 
370-81 (1981) and references cited therein; Ochinsky, supra note 92. Cf DIERKENS, supra note 13, at 
76-88. 
103. DIERKENS, supra note 13 at 62-64. Among the recent laws cited as note 92 supra, those which 
regulate the donation of organs ex vivo carefully provide that removal may take place only as a last resort 
in saving a life or substantially improving the health of the recipient and on condition that the risk 
incurred by the donor be limited if not null. Practically speaking these criteria are equivalent to those 
concerning necessity. Further, it is generally required that the donor be at least 18 years old. The 
removal of an organ from a minor is either flatly prohibited, or subject to strict conditions. See the 
Resolution No. 78 (29) of the Council of Europe, supra note 92. 
104. European doctrine has developed relatively little in this extremely complex and controversial 
area, relying essentially on general principles concerning the protection of the individual. Anglo-
American attitudes appear much more tolerant. See P. A. FREUND, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN 
SUBJECTS (N.Y., Braziller 1970) [hereinafter cited as FREUND]; H. K. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL (1970); EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS (J. Katz ed. 1972); G. J. ANNAS, L. H. 
GLANTZ & B. F. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Annas]; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 683-710,1764-81 (1978) (Directives 
for human experimentation); Baudoin, supra note 6; Hennau-Hublet, supra note at 6; Somerville supra 
note 32, at 30; Giesen, La responsabilite par rapport aux nouveaux traitements et aux experimentations, in LA 
RESPONSABILITE CIVILE DES MEDECINS, 63-116 (Masson 1976) (Fifth Colloquium on European Law, 
organized by the Council of Europe at Lyon, June 3-5, 1975). 
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On the other hand, any act which tends to demean even a consenting person is 
radically illicit and a fortiori if the act is, in addition, immoral and profit-
oriented. l05 The notions of respect for the person, public order and decency are 
found in Article 5 of the Italian Civil Code, which provides that a person may not 
engage in any act which causes a permanent diminution of physical integrity or 
which is otherwise contrary to the law, public order and decency. The standard 
of proportional risk appears, albeit in very general terms, in Article 20 of the 
Quebec Civil Code as modified by the act of December I, 1971: "An adult of age 
may consent in writing to the alienation between living persons of a part of his 
body or may consent to be submitted to experimentation, provided that the risk 
thereby engendered is not out of proportion with the expected benefit." One can 
debate whether this article should not also include reference to public order and 
decency.l06 In all cases, the question centers on the sovereign power of judicial 
interpretation and on praetorian law. 
The requisite conditions validating consent itself are particularly delicate. 107 
Consent should always be susceptible to revocation, since action taken with 
regard to the person as personality cannot be viewed under the same rules as 
those regulating true contractual arrangements, which fall within the scope of 
Article 1134 of the French Civil Code and cannot be revised without the agree-
ment of both parties. los The above considerations also extend into the area of 
civil liability with respect to the role which the willingness ofthe victim may play 
as to grounds for any partial or total absolution of liability, especially as to bodily 
injury. 
Anglo-American doctrine and jurisprudence appear to have responded to the 
question in a rather abrupt manner. According to the most informed authorities, 
consent and the accompanying assumption of risk are grounds for total elimina-
tion of liability, be it a question of personal injury or damage to property, a 
fundamental principle of common law being the application of the maxim 
"volenti non fit injuria in private matters."109 In this area, American courts have 
105. It is the same with prostitution, although not criminalized under Belgian law, and with the sale 
of organs. 
106. MAYRAND, supra note I, at No.5; E. DELEURY, LE SUJET RECONNU COMME OBJET DE DROIT 529 
(Cahiers de Droit 1977). See also Rapport sur la reconnaissance de certains droits concernant Ie corps 
Humain 6, Office de Revision du Code Civil (Montreal 1971). 
107. See Somerville, supra note 32, at 75-119 and references cited therein on the difficulty in 
clarifying the notion of free and knowing consent by a competent person, and especially the formidable 
problems caused by presumed or imputed consent of patients who are incompetent (e.g., children, the 
dying, mentally handicapped). See also Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted 
Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48 (1976); Crepeau, Le consentement du mineur en matiere de soins et 
traitements medicaux et chirurgicaux selon Ie droit civil Canadien, CAN. B. REv 247 (1974); W. GAYLIN, 
J. MEISLER & R. NEVILLE, OPERATING ON THE MIND (THE PSYCHO-SURGERY CONFLICT) (1975). 
108. See Jack, supra note 86, at 380 et seq.; TALLON, supra note 28, at Nos. 139 et seq. 
109. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAw OF TORTS § 18, at 102-10, § 67 at 450 (West 3d ed. 1964) 
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER], for American law; R. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE LAw OF TORTS 497, 
§§ 187, 188, at 497 (7th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HEUSTON], for English law, distinguishing 
between the notion of consent as a defense against an accusation of intentional tort, and assumption of 
risk as a defense against an accusation of negligence. 
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adopted an attitude less paternalistic than that of the French by refusing to 
protect the individual from his own folly in consenting to harm at the hands of 
others. Consent, even implicit, eliminates even the existence of any tort. 110 
Nonetheless, this harsh stance has been subject to criticism, and its walls have 
been partially eroded by legislative and judicial measures,u I 
French and Belgian doctrine and jurisprudence have formulated solutions in 
accordance with a totally different philosophy, in the absence of any express 
textual guidance comparable to Article 44 of the Swiss Code of Obligations. I 12 
Consent of the victim to an injurious act gives rise to total exoneration of the 
accused only to the extent that the latter is utterly without fault, or only if his 
fault is entirely due to that of the victim. 113 
On the other hand, the very notion of "acceptance of the risk"114 is extremely 
ambiguous, be it in potentially dangerous activities such as sports, hunting, 
transportation, dangerous military assignment or medical treatment. Above all, 
the simple awareness of risk, absent express agreement of nonliability,l1;; does 
not entail the acceptance of injury at the hands of third parties. Any acceptance 
of potential injury is possible only as to abnormal risks. Furthermore, French 
and Belgian doctrine requires that the victim knowingly and voluntarily accepted 
exaggerated risks l16 without any legitimate and reasonable motive, or that the 
victim should have known of such risks, thereby committing an act of reckless-
ness or negligence, which may be considered a cause of the harm. Such negli-
gence can never totally excuse an act of the defendant which has brought about 
the harm.117 Because the victim must bear, in addition, the entire brunt of the 
110. According to PROSSER, supra note 109, § 18 at 107, the assumption of risk relieves the defendant 
of his duty of care towards the victim, and thus one of the essential conditions of his responsibility 
towards third persons under common law. See HANOTIAU, Torts et responsabiliti civile, ANN ALES DE DROIT 
DE LOUVAIN 13 (1980). The result is a total exoneration of the defendant, even if negligent himself. As 
to intentional torts, consent, even if only implicit, is a total defense. Compare as to English law HEUSTON, 
supra note 109, at 498 et seq. 
Ill. See PROSSER, supra note 109, at § 67; HEUSTON, supra note 109, at §§ 187 and 188. 
112. Under this article the judge may reduce or eliminate damages where the injured party con-
sented to his injury or contributed towards its creation. Although German law does not expressly refer 
to the consent of the victim, German doctrine relies on Section 254, paragraph 2 of the BGB to 
determine the obligation and extent of reparation where the victim neglected to avoid or lessen the 
harm. As to a right of civil action in the case of a victim's consent to a penal offense, see also 
FAHMI-ABDOU, supra note 29, at 164 et seq.; Doublier, supra note 29, at No.4. 
113. 2 H. L. MAZEAUD & J. MAZEAUD, TRAITE THERIOQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 
DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE No. 1483 (6th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as MAZEAUD]. See also DALCQ, 
supra note 97, at Vol. 2, No. 2690. 
114. See MAZEAUD, supra note 113, vol. II, at Nos. 1485-1500 for French law; see DALCQ, supra note 97, 
vol. II, at Nos. 2690-2702 and vol. I, at No. 522. 
115. See MAZEAUD, supra note 113, vol. II, No. 1490; DALCQ, supra note 97, vol. II., at No. 2695. 
116. See the examples cited in MAZEAUD, supra note 113, vol. II, at No. 1486. 
117. See MAZEAUD, supra note 113, vol. II, at No. 1491-93; DALCQ, supra note 97, vol. II, at No. 2700. 
This idea is related to the Anglo-American notion of contributory negligence, as well as to assumption 
of risk, especially in England where the contributory negligence of the victim no longer is a complete 
defense since enactment of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945. See HEUSToN,supra 
note 109, § 188, at 503. 
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injury caused by fortuitous events - and the more dangerous the activity, the 
higher the risk - certain authors conclude that the notion of acceptance of the 
risk is not only imprecise and dangerous, but also useless with respect to aquilian 
responsibility."8 
Agreements disclaiming responsibility in advance signify anticipatory renun-
ciation of the right to demand recovery of damages rather than an acceptance of 
risk or injury. The question of their validity, which has stirred up considerable 
controversy,119 has provoked different solutions in France 120 and in Belgium. 121 
In France, where the question remains unsettled, 122 jurisprudence and doctrine 
accept the validity of such agreements generally in contractual matters, with 
exceptions as provided by law, but excluding fraud or negligent misrepresenta-
tion, which has been traditionally assimilated to fraud,123 whether committed by 
the principal or by his agent. In addition, the validity of agreements concerning 
bodily injury, whatever the gravity of the fault, has been largely contestedY4 
Finally, disclaimers of liability are null as against public policy in matters of 
delictual responsibility, since Article 1382 of the Civil Code is considered a 
matter of ordre public,125 namely, laws in the public interest which cannot be 
bargained for. 
118. See DALCQ, supra note 97, vol II, at No. 2694 and 2697 and vol. 1 at Nos. 523-31. 
119. See P. Esmein, Les clauses de non-responsibilite, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 313 (1970); 2 
BAUDRy-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL 589 (1925) (Bonnecase, Supp.); P. Durant, Des conven-
tions d'irresponsabilite (Paris 1931) (Thesis); De Harven, Des conventions tendant a liberer de la responsabi-
lite, REVUE DE DROIT BELGE 219-44 (1926-1930) [hereinafter cited as De Harven]; Van Ryn, Les clauses de 
non-responsabiliti, REVUE GEN. A. RESP. 703 (1931). 
120. See 2 R. SAVATIER, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE EN DROIT FRAN<;AIS Nos. 659-65 (2d ed. 
1951); Robina, Les conventions d'irresponsabilite dans !n jurisprudence contemporaine, REVUE TRIMES-
TRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL I (1951); 3 MAZEAUD & TUNC, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPON-
SABILITE CIVIL No. 2.513 (5th ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as MAZEAUD & TUNC]; MARTY & RAYNAUD, 
supra note 28, vol. II, at Nos. 535 (1962); P. LE TOURNEAU, La responsabiliti civile No. 280 (Dalloz 1976); 
WEILL & TERRE, us OBLIGATIONS Nos. 445 et seq. and 639 (Precis Dalloz 1975) [hereinafter cited as 
OBLIGATIONS]; B. Starck, Observations sur Ie regime juridUzue des c!nuses de non-responsabilite ou limitatives de 
responsabiliti, [1974] Dalloz, Chronique 157 et seq. [hereinafter cited as Starck]. 
121. See 2 DE PAGE, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL BELGE Nos. 1052-58 [hereinafter cited as DE 
PAGE]; 2 DALCQ, RESPONSABILITE CIVILE, No. 4280; J. Lehrer, Des clauses d'irresponsabilite, REv. GEN. A. 
RESP. No. 6800 (1982). 
122. Starck, supra note 120. 
123. See also Article 100 of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations, which declares void every 
agreement which tends to hold harmless in advance a debtor from liability for fraud or misrepresenta-
tion, and Article 1229 of the Italian Civil Code. Compare, conversely, Article 276, paragraph 2 of the 
German Civil Code. 
124. See MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra note 120, at vol. III, No. 2529 and references therein, and No. 
2575; P. Esmein, Meditation sur les conventwns d'irresponsabilite en cas de dommage cause a la personne, 
MELANGES SAVATIER 271 (1965); Cf MARTY & RAYNAUD,Supra note 120, at vol. II, No. 540; Starck,supra 
note 120, at No. 37. 
125. See MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra note 120, vol. III, No. 2567; MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 120, at 
vol. II, No. 545 bis et seq; OBLIGATIONS, supra note 120, at No. 639; Starck, supra note 120, at Nos. 20 to 
24. 
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In Belgi urn, liability for civil offenses is not a matter of ordre public 126 and fra ud 
does not encompass negligent misrepresentation. 127 Starting from completely 
different premises, Belgian jurisprudence accepts the validity of nonliability 
clauses without differentiating between contractual or delictual liability,128 nor 
between damage to personality or injury to persons,129 except as to personal 
fraud (dol personnel) and other exceptions under law. In addition, no clause may 
operate to render null the subject of the contract. 130 The Belgian Cour de 
Cassation (court of highest instance) upholds clauses relative to fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation on the part of agents of the principal. 13l The result of this 
approach is to allow the victim to waive in advance any claim for damages the 
scope of which the victim cannot know, and without regard to the gravity of the 
offense, even when such offense constitutes a penal infraction, a civil offense 
being a penal one at the same time if bodily injury is involved. 132 Although this 
solution has found general doctrinal acceptance, it has not been without its 
critics. 133 In any event, such agreements are not valid in medical matters, what-
ever the nature and the gravity of the offense, and, a fortiori, when the act 
causing the injury is not medically justified.134 
C. Medical Intervention 
The medical activity which constitutes the very heart of our subject lies at the 
exact interface of penal and civil rules of law relative to the human body. In this 
context, medical action constitutes by definition an intentional physical inter-
vention, and is the illustration par excellence of the tension which exists between 
126. Casso B., Feb. 21,1907, [1907] Pas. I at 135; DE PAGE, sufJra note 121, at vol. II, No. 1053; 
DALCQ, sufJra note 97, at vol. II, No. 4294. 
127. Cass., Sept. 25, 1959, [1960] Concl. Av. Gen. Mahaux, Pas. I at 112; JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 
114, (1960), Note J. J. Rotthier; REVUE CRITIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE BELGE 5, 6-30 (1960); DALCQ, sufJra 
note 97, at vol. II, Nos. 4301-10. See also Hayoit de Termicourt, Dol etfau1elourde en matiere d'execu1wn des 
contrats, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 601 (1957). 
128. DALCQ, sUfJra note 97, at vol. II, Nos. 4318-19. 
129. See Van Ryn, Les clauses de non-responsabilite, etude de quelques restrictions a leur validite, REv. GEN. A. 
RESP. 703 (1931); Gand,june 27,1958, REv. GEN. A. RESP. 6257 (1959); DE PAGE,sufJra note 121, at vol. 
II, Nos. 1053 and 1056; Casso B., Mar. 14, 1959, [1959] Pas. I 140. 
130. DALCQ, sUfJra note 97, at vol. II, No. 4317; DALCQ, Faut-illimiter La responsabilite des fJrofessions 
liberales?, MELANGES BAUGNIET 91-112 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DALcQ-limiter]. 
131. Cass B., Sept. 25, 1959, sUfJra note 127; DALCQ, sUfJra note 97, at vol. II, Nos. 4311-17. 
132. See DALCQ, supra note 97, at vol. 1., No. 300; I X. RYCKMANS & R. MEERT-VAN DE PUT, LES DROITS 
ET LES OBLIGATIONS DES MEDECINS No. 551 (Brussels Larcier 1971) [hereinafter cited as RYCKMANS & 
MEERT-VAN DE PUT]. 
133. De Harven, sufJra note 119, at 242-44. 
134. See RYCKMANS & MEERT-VAN DE PUT,sufJra note 132, at Nos. 589-91; I DALCQ, sUfJra note 97, at 
Nos. 1066, 1097; DALcQ-limiter, sufJra note 130, at 100-11. See also R. Savatier, Imperialisme medical sur le 
terrain du droit, le "permis d'operer" et les fJratUjues amemaines, [1952] Dalloz, Chronique 157; Article 90 of 
the Loi sur les services de santi et les servicessociaux de la Province du Quebec, L.Q. (1971) ch. 48, cited in 
MAYRAND,SUfJra note I, at No.3. 
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the principal of conservation and protection on the one hand, and the principal of 
autonomy on the other hand. 
Surprisingly, the law rarely defines the legal foundation and conditions of this 
important area, which is left to jurisprudence to regulate by drawing from 
general principles of criminal and civil law as well as, in a large number of 
countries, rules of medical deontology, or ethics. 135 Notably, such is the case in 
Belgium, where, aside from the rules pertaining to the practice of the healing 
arts/ 36 which concern essentially prerequisites to professional proficiency, the 
law does not specifically condone the immunity from criminal prosecution which 
physicians and surgeons enjoy.137 
Different explanations in support of this phenomenon have been set forth 
with varying degrees of persuasiveness. The absence of intent to harm,138 with-
out distinguishing between tortious intention and motive, or the simple intention 
to heal, is an insufficient explanation in that Belgian and French law do not 
permit motive as a ground for privilege. 139 As explained previously,140 the mere 
consent of the patient is not sufficient, although indispensable, except in excep-
135. For Anglo-American attitudes, see Le traitement medical et Ie droit criminel, (Commission de 
RHorme du Droit du Canada, Serie Protection de la Vie, Doc. No. 26, at 13 et seq. (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Le traitement); M. Somerville, Le consentement a J'acte medical (Commission de RHorme du 
Droit du Canada, Serie Protection de la Vie, Doc. d'Etude, at 119-25 (1980». Under common law, 
medical treatment and surgery are considered prima facie offenses involving impermissible use of force 
against the person. Absent any other defense provided by law, such acts are not justified unless the 
patient has given his free and knowing consent, the acts were reasonable and for therapeutic purposes, 
and done by qualified persons. Necessity is also a valid justification, especially in emergencies, when the 
requisite consent cannot be obtained. In Canada, Article 45 of the Criminal Code expressly provides a 
defense on behalf of whomever performs surgery provided he applied reasonable skill and care, and 
the operation was reasonable and in the interests of the patient. The scope of this Article and of Article 
198 as well remains unclear nonetheless. The Commission on Law Reform has thus concluded that 
specific provisions are in order to specifically regulate medical treatment. See Indian Penal Code section 
88 (Central Law Agency 1963). As to European countries, see ANRYS, LEs PROFESSIONS MEDICALES ET 
PARAMEDICALES DANS LE MARCHE COMMUN (Brussels, Larcier 1972). 
136. Arrete Royal No. 78 of Nov. 10, 1967 relative to the healing arts, [1967) Monitor Belge, Nov. 14, 
1967; RYCKMANS & MEERT-VAN DE PUT, supra note 132, at I. 
137. See P. Foriers, De !'etat de neeesite en droit penal No. 296 (Brussels, Bruylant 1951) [hereinafter 
cited as Foriers). In France, see GARGON, CODE PENAL ANNOTE, art. 311, no. 80 [hereinafter cited as 
GARGON]. 
138. See R. LEGROSS, L'ELEMENT MORAL DANS LES INFRACTIONS No. 276 (Liege 1952); 2 NYPELS, LE 
CODE PENAL INTERPRETE art. 398, at 319-20, No.3. 
139. Foriers, supra note 137, at Nos. 303-05; TROUSSE, supra note 8, at Nos. 2595 and 2746. See also 
the French authors cited at note 43 supra. 
140. See TROUSSE, supra note 83, at No. 2746; Foriers, supra note 137, at No. 306-23; DALCQ, supra 
note 97, at vol. I, No. 1059; RYCKMANS & MEERT-VAN DE PUT, supra note 132, at vol. I, No. 588. See also 
the French authors cited at note 10 supra. See Levasseur, La responsabilite penale du mideein, in ECK, LE 
MEDECIN FACE AUX RISQUES ET A LA RESPONSABILITE 139-40 (Paris, Fayard 1968) [hereinafter cited as 
Levasseur). 
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tional cases,141 Whatever the system, the requisite consent IS never enough In 
itself,142 
Traditionally In France,143 and more recently in Belgium,144 medical immu-
nity has been considered as im plicitly authorized by the law, based on articles 
regulating the legal practice of the healing arts, This explanation, however, does 
not imply that the mere granting of a medical diploma per se can confer upon 
every act taken by a physician the quality of a medical act. To be immune, such 
action must be within the framework of "normal" medical activity, It must clearly 
correspond to a medical necessity in order to protect the life or health of the 
patient, through diagnosis, treatment and prevention. 145 
The more the act is aleatory, traumatizing or destructive, the stricter the 
requirement of therapeutic necessity must be, even while conceding that "medi-
cal necessity" is a more flexible concept than that of necessity in its strictest sense, 
which criminal law regards as a ground for justification. 146 Whereas the legal 
141. See RYCKMANS & MEERT VAN DE PUT, supra note 132, at vol. I, Nos. 569-81; DALCQ, supra note 97, 
at vol. I, Nos. 1070 et seq. and No. 1075-78; Dalcq, La responsabilite medicale, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
PRIVAATRECHT 345-62 (1974). In French law, see SAVATIER & PEQUIGNOT, supra note 97, at Nos. 247-53; 
MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra note 120, at vol. II, No. 511, pp. 589-93; J. PENNEAU, LA RESPONSAB1UTE 
MEDICALE Nos. 56-57 (Paris Sirey 1977) [hereinafter cited as PENNEAU]. 
142. See, under Anglo-American law where consent plays an extremely important role, Somerville, 
supra note 32, at 47-49 and 120-22 and references therein. In German law, it appears that medical acts, 
due to their social utility, cannot give rise to an offense, prima facie, absent any material illegality 
(materielle Rechtswidrigkeit). Jurisprudence, on the other hand, views the patient's consent as a 
justification, within the fluctuating bounds of public order and moral standards. See Section 226a, StGB. 
See JESCHECK, supra note 58, at 159-60 and 149-50 (1969) and references therein. The proposed new 
amendment to the German Penal Code of 1962 clarified this ambiguity somewhat by viewing medical 
treatment as not giving rise to a bodily injury (blessure corporelle) if such treatment is necessary and for 
therapeutic purposes. For the Austrian position, see HEINL, supra note 57, at vol. 5, § 90, n.6. For Swiss 
law, see M. NEY, LA RESPONSABIUTE DES MEDECINS ET DE LEURS AUXlLAIRES, NOTAMENT A RAISON DE L'ACTE 
OPERAT01RE 498-504 (Dereneaz 1979). 
143. French Penal Code art. 327. See GARC;ON, supra note 137, at art. 311, No. 80; Vidal, supra note 
32, at No. 233; BouzAT & PINATEL, supra note 32, at No. 309; MERLE & VITU, supra note 32, at No. 426; 
STEFANI, supra note 32, at No. 360; PENNEAU, supra note 141, at Nos. 134-35; Levasseur, supra note 140, 
at 140 et seq.; see also LOGoz, COMMENTAIRE DU CODE PENAL SUISSE art. 31, at 165-66. 
144. Corr. Bruxelles, Sept. 27, 1969, [1969] JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 635; RYCKMANS & MEERT-VAN 
DE PUT, supra note 132, at vol. I, No. 543; see Tahon, Le consentement tk La victime, JOURNAL DES 
TRIBUNAUX 496 (1951); TROUSSE, supra note 8, at Nos. 2606-31. 
145. Foriers, supra note 137, at No. 324; TROUSSE, supra note 8, at Nos. 2746-50; Dalcq, La responsabi-
lite medicale, TiJDSCHRIFT VOOR PRIVAATRECHT 352-55 (1974); Cass B., Dec. 16, 1948, JOURNAL DES 
TRIBUNAUX 84 (1948), n. R. Savatier (civil action). Cf Corr. Bruxelles, Sept. 27, 1969, JOURNAL DES 
TRIBUNAUX (criminal action). In Canada, the notion of the patient's well-being, contained in Article 45 
of the Criminal Code, lends itself to ambiguous interpretations. Nonetheless, under the majority view 
this notion appears to concern solely the medical benefit accorded the patient's physical or mental 
health, and not the patient's well-being in the larger sense. See Le traitement, supra note 135, at 7-9 and 
46. 
146. This implies that I) the right or the interest to be protected is greater or at least equal to the 
right or interest to be sacrificed; 2) the danger is imminent or serious; 3) it is impossible to avoid 
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validity of plastic surgery for aesthetic reasons is no longer in doubt, the legal 
responsibility of the surgeon is all the more recognized to the extent the risks 
outweigh disproportionately the objectives,l47 notwithstanding the wishes of the 
patient or any waivers he may have signed. A fortiori, the same should apply to 
nontherapeutic experiments even with the consent of the subject,148 or especially 
to sterilizations, which can be irreparable, or to sex change operations, which 
present the aggravating characteristic of being both mutilating and organically 
destructive. Since there are no specific statutes, such acts can, in principle, be 
justified only as therapeutic or necessary.149 
Remarkably, those foreign laws explicitly permitting sex change operations 
or castration require observance of strict therapeutic standards. 150 The 
the harm otherwise; 4) the agent has himself not created the situation of necessity. See TROUSSE, supra 
note 33, at Nos. 2697-2728. Necessity has traditionally served tojustify ther'!peutic abortion. See also 
Corr. Bruxelles, Sept. 27, 1969, [1969] JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX (transexualism). 
147. See TROUSSE, supra note 8, at No. 2750; DALCQ supra note 97, at vol. I, Nos. 1066-1069; 
RYCKMANS & MEERT-VAN DE PUT, supra note 132, at vol. I, No. 599 and vol. II, -Nos. 639-44. In French 
law, see MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra note 120, at vol. I, No. 511, at 592-93; I'ENNEAU, supra note 141, at Nos. 
30, 53; G. BOYER CHAMMARD & P. MONZEIN, LA RESPONSABIUTE MEDICALE 230-40 (Paris, P. V.F. 1974) 
[hereinafter cited as BOYER]. 
148. See TROUSSE, supra note 8, No. 2749; DALCQ, supa note 97, at vol. I, No. 1078; RYCKMANS & 
MEERT-VAN DE PUT, supra note 132, at vol. I, Nos. 593-97. See also H. Anrys, L'experimentation humaine 
dans ks domaines medical et pharmaceutiIJue, BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE BELGE D'ETHIQUE ET DE MORALE 
MEDICALE 8, 9-21 (1975); Hennau-Hublet,supra note 6. In French law,see I'ENNEAu,supra note 141, at 
Nos. 141-43; BOYER, supra note 147, at 197-211; Laget, Experimentation et medicin in ECK, LE MEDECIN 
FACE AUX RISQUES, ET A LA RESPONSIBIUTE (Fayard 1968); J. M. AUBY, us ESSAIS DE MEDICAMENTS SUR 
L'HOMME, PROBLEMES JURI DIQUES, (Masson, Droit et Pharmacie 1977). 
Canadian-American law emphasizes the free and knowing consent of the person while also requiring 
a balancing of the risks with the benefits. See Somerville, supra note 32; Baudouin, supra note 6; 
Halushka v. Vniv. of Saskatchewan, 53 D.LR 2d 436 (1965); P. FREUND, EXPERIMENTATION WITH 
HUMAN SUBJECTS, (1970); G. ANNAS, L GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMEN-
TATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 1977). 
149. As to sterilization, in Belgium see TROUSSE, supra note 8, at vol. II, No. 670; R Grosemans, 
Considerations juridiIJues et deontologiques sur ks sterilisations operatoires sur l'homme, 1960-1961 REVUE DE 
DROIT PENAL ET CRIMINEL 875; Meulders-Klein, Considerations juridiques sur La sterilisation ChirUTgicale, 
ANN. DROIT LOUVAIN 34-54 (1967); RYCKMANS & MEERT-VAN DE PUT, supra note 132, at vol. II, No. 670. 
See also Article 54 of the CODE DE DEONTOLOGIE MEDICALE promulgated by the Conseil National de 
rOrdre des Medecins, stating the requirement of necessity; BULLETIN DU CONSEIL DE L'ORDRE DES 
MEDECINS DU BRABANT at 14(1968) and at 36 (1974). In France,see Casso F., july 1, 1937,[1938] Sirey 
193, note Tortat; J. SAVATIER, Aspectsjuridiques de La sterilisation chirugicale, CAHIERS LAENNEC 54 (1964); 
MergeI', Probtemes juridiques de La sterilisation .fominine en fonction de ses aspects medicaux et sociaux, [1963] 
jurisclasseur Periodique, I, 1770; Blanc, Probtemes juridiques des sterilisations chiTUrgicaks, J. GYN. OBST. 
BIOL. REPROD. 737-47 (1977). See also Article 22 of the new French CODE DE DEONTOLOGIE MEDICALE No. 
79,80, june 28, 1979,,[1979], Dalloz Legislation, 233: "Aucune mutilation ne peut etre pratiquee sans 
motif medical trios serieux et, sauf urgence ou impossibilite qu'apres information des interesses et avec 
leur consentement." In its original version this article explicitly encompassed sterilization. 
150. See the Swedish Law of Apr. 21, 1972 on the determination of sex and the German Law of 
Aug. 15, 1969 on voluntary castration. The German Law of Sept. 10, 1980 on change of name and 
attestation of sex, Transsexuellengesetz-Standesamt, 1981, at 36-39, does not require authorization for 
the operation itself, which the law implicitly recognizes as legal, since the law requires that it be 
completed before allowing an attestation of change of sex. The Law of Aug. 15, 1969, applies to this 
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decision of the tribunal correctionel of Brussels, rendered September 27, 1969 in 
favor of acquittal following the death of a young transsexual, is a case in point.!5! 
It is true that some foreign authors have observed that surgical and hormonal 
treatment is only a palliative which does not cure the transsexuaJ.152 However, it 
is possible that such treatment im proves the stituation of the patient, who is often 
led to suicide by the torment within him. In this case, necessity may be recog-
nized, absent any other means of relief.1 53 The principle of self-determination, 
however, is inapplicable. It is interesting to note in this matter that the European 
Commission on Human Rights, in the case of Van Osterwijck v. Belgium, concern-
ing a request for a correction in the patient's civil status registration (etat civil) 
following a sex change operation, recognized that the Belgian state had violated 
Article 8, paragraph I of the European Convention on Human Rights by 
refusing such correction, but only because the plaintiff had to give indiscreet 
explanations as to the discrepancy between his physical appearance and his 
identity papers, and not because of any violation of the plaintiff's privacy or 
right to sexual self-determination.!54 
The right to self-determination in the area of sterilization as a purely con-
traceptive matter is clearly gaining in acceptance in a number of countries.!50 
type of operation. Absent special statutes, other countries justify treatment on therapeutic grounds. See, 
as to Great Britain, the case of Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E. R. 47 (1966). In Switzerland, see Trib. Fed., 
July I, 1966, [1966] JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX suisse, I, at 570, note Gauthier. On the other hand, 
French doctrine and jurisprudence appear to regard the operation as illicit under penal law, even ifno 
criminal action has ever been initiated. Moreover, civil law does not recognize the change which has 
occurred. See Petit, L'ambiguiti du droit face au syndrome du transsexualisme, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
CIVIL 263, 264-96 (1976) and references therein. Regarding German law, see N. J. Augstein, Zum 
Transsexuellengesetz, DAS STANDESAMT 10-16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Augstein]; L. Linossier, Le 
transsexualisme: esquisse pour un profil culture! etjuridique, [1981] Dalloz, Chronique, XIX [hereinafter cited 
as Linoissier]; D. Thouvenin. Le transsexualisme, une question d'etat meconnue, REVUE DE DROIT SANITAIRE, 
291 (1979); S. A. Strauss, Transsexualism and the Law, COMPo AND INT'L L. J. of SOUTHERN AFRICA 357 
(1970); Groffier, Certains aspects due transexualism en droit quebecois, in Le corps humain et Ie droit, 26 
TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT 203 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Groffier]; R. Kouri, Certain 
Legal Aspects of Modern Medicine, Sex Reassignment and Sterilization (McGill Univ. 1978) (thesis). 
IS!. Corr. Bruxelles, Sept. 27, 1969, [1969] JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX. See also BULLETIN DU CONSEIL 
DE L'ORDRE DES MEDECINS DU BRABANT, No. I at 13-15 (1977). 
152. See Groffier, supra note 150, at 120. See also Corr. Bruxelles, Sept. 27, 1969, supra note 144; 
Augstein, supra note 150, at 12-13. 
153. According to certain authors, justification is found in the necessity of relieving psychological 
stress; legally recognizing the patient's sex amounts to an act of rescue of a person in distress. See 
Linossier, supra note ISO, at 144; Augstein, supra note ISO, at 12. 
154. The European Court on November 5, 1980 dismissed the claim for failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies. 
155. See the Danish Law No. 218 of June 13, 1973 on sterlization and castration, RECUEIL INTERNA-
TIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 818 (1975); the Swedish Law No. 580 of June 12, 1975 on steriliza-
tion, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 940 (1975); the Norwegian Law No. 57 of 
June 3, 1977 of sterilization, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 128 et seq. (1979); 
section 90, paragraph 2 of the Austrian Penal Code as amended by the Federal Law of Jan. 23, 1974, 
RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 239 (1976); the British National Health Service 
Amendment Act (Family Planning) of Oct. 26, 1972, ch. 72, §§ I, 2, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE 
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The practice is tending to spread at an increasing rate. 156 Nonetheless, the very 
principle of the legality of such practice remains controversial in countries such 
as France and Belgium, where the legislatures have taken no action. 157 As to 
abortion, the majority of countries expressly prohibited it on the ground that it 
constituted an act of dominion not only over one's self, but over that of a third 
person. Such rules, subject to a recent evolution which is examined further, 
brooked no "exception except in cases of dire emergency.15S 
Thus, the unalienability of the human body does not form an absolute princi-
ple. Factors such as necessity, respect for the person, altruistic striving and the 
proportion of the gravity to the intended benefit have traditionally traced the 
boundaries limiting the autonomy of the individual's freedom of choice in a 
more or less strict manner. Inversely, the consent of the individual, although not 
sufficient to legitimize every compromise of his physical integrity, is itself an 
indispensable element of any legitimacy in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances. 159 This subtle element maintains a delicate equilibrium between the 
principles of inviolability and autonomy of the individual, and between protec-
tion and freedom. A particular case, which is examined later, reflects the fragility 
of this equilibrium and the dilemma which it envelops: the patient's refusal of 
medical care, thereby incurring the risk of death, places into direct conflict the 
obligation to provide assistance and the obligation to respect the volition of the 
individual over his physical integrity. At present, this equilibrium has an increas-
ing tendency to be broken in favor of the principle of autonomy in the guise of 
other values which are now explored. 
III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND COMPLETE DOMINION 
OVER ONE'S SELF 
In order to examine the process of inversion which has occurred with respect 
to the priorities between the principles of inviolability of the person on the one 
hand, and self-determination on the other, as well as the path which this inver-
sion has taken, it is necessary to examine the evolution which had its inception 
around fifteen years ago in the United States. This is not to say that this evolution 
LEGISLATION SANITAIRE, 723 (1975); the Italian Law No. 194 of May 22,1978 on voluntary termination 
of pregnancy art. 22, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE d:GISLATION SANITAIRE 859-67 (1978). In West 
Germany, the Dhorn case, BGH 20.81 (Oct. 27, 1964), recognized voluntary sterilization. Further, 
damages may be had against the physician who fails to perform the operation successfully. BGH 18.3 
1980, FamRZ at 654 (1980). See also Stepan & Kellog, The World's Law Concerning Voluntary Sterilization 
for Family Planning Purposes, CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 72 (1973-1975) [hereinafter cited as Stepan & Kellog). 
156. Each region of the world and various countries have adopted different methods. See J. P. 
Sardon, La sterilisation dans Ie monde, donnees statistiques, POPULATION 607 (1979). 
157. See J. M. Auby, Le consentement en matiere de sterilisatwn, elements de droit compare, ACTES DU V' 
CONGRES MONDIAL DE DROIT MEDICAL, GENT 1979 Doc. RONEO. 57; Stepan & Kellogg, supra note 155; 
Kouri, The Legality of Purely Contraceptive Sterilization, SHERBROOKE L. REV. I, 1-48 (1976). 
158. See TROUSSE, supra note 8, at No. 2726; Foriers, supra note 137, at Nos. 336, 337-46. 
159. See MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra note 120, at vol. I, No. 511, pp. 589-92; DALcQ, supra note 97, at vol. 
I, Nos. 1070. 
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has not appeared as well in other Western countries, notably in the areas of 
sterilization l60 and abortion. 161 However, the conceptual mechanism which 
forms its base is most clearly visible in the United States, by virtue of historic, 
philosophical and juridical reasons. 
Since the Magna Carta of 1215, England has been the self-proclaimed cham-
pion of individ ualliberty, and the individualistic liberalism of Locke formed the 
very basis of the American Constitution. More than the Charter organizing the 
federal political powers, the U.S. Constitution was conceived as the guarantor of 
those natural and fundamental liberties which the American people held to be 
theirs as self-evident at the same time they consented to found the Union. 162 It is 
at the beginning of the Declaration of Independence where these words are 
inscribed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted among men .... " 
The power of the judiciary to rule on the constitutionality of the laws and any 
other act susceptible of compromising the exercise of the freedoms prescribed by 
the Bill of Rights stands as a sentinel over this solemn declaration of rights which, 
in opposition to the French Declaration of 1789, omits to formulate any reserva-
tion in favor of the law, regarded by the French revolutionaries as expressive of 
the popular will. 163 Such is the reason for analyzing the spectrum of American 
jurisprudence construing the constitutionality of the laws concerning the subject 
of this article. This approach is not the less interesting for European countries 
because of the possible parallel between American jurisprudence and that of the 
European Court of Human Rights, itself the judicial guarantor of the rights and 
freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, and also 
vested with the power to interpret this Charter. 164 
160. See the laws cited supra note 158. 
161. See the Danish Law No. 350 of June 13, 1973 on termination of pregnancy, RECUEIL INTERNA-
TIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 822 (1973); the Austrian Law of Jan. 23, 1974, art. 97, RECUEIL 
INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 237, 238-40 (1976); the Swedish Law No. 595 of June 14, 
1974 on abortion, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 737 (1974); the French Law No. 
75-17 of Jan. 17, 1975 on voluntary termination of pregnancy, Journal Officiei, Jan. 18, 1975; the West 
German laws of June 18, 1974 (declared unconstitutional), RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION 
SANITAlRE 820 (1974), and Law of May 18, 1976, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 
(1976); the Italian Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978, RECUEIL INTERNATIONAL DE LEGISLATION SANITAIRE 858 
(1978). 
162. See Rivero, supra note 10, at 37-38 and 42 et seq. 
163. See Uf. at 38-42. 
164. Art. 45 of the Convention. In the Marckx case, decided against Belgium onJune 13, 1979, the 
European Court interpreted Article 8 of the Convention on Respect for Private and Family Life as 
placing an affirmative obligation on the government to modify its civil legislation on descendancy. See 
F. Rigaux, La Loi cotuiamnee, JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 513-24 (1979). This innovative interpretation 
might well lead to a power of review comparable to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, especially if 
decisions of the European Court were to be directly applicable to the states which have ratified the 
Convention. 
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Two new and essential notions appear throughout this analysis. First, the 
notions of "privacy" and the "right of privacy," concepts which are not easily 
translated for European readers. Second, the notion of "quality of life," gener-
ally contrasted with the notion of the "sanctity of life," and thus with the 
inviolability of life. 165 Both ideas carry with them an ethical connotation preced-
ing any juridical value. For an understanding of the following discussion, a brief 
preliminary revision of the several elements of the American system of judicial 
review of the constitutionality of the laws is indispensable. 166 
A. Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of the Laws in the United States 
The power of American judges to review the constitutionality of the laws does 
not have its origin in legislation, but rather in jurisprudence. The decision of 
Marbury v. Madison, rendered in 1803 by John Marshall, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, based this power upon the supremacy of the Constitution and 
the role which devolves upon each judge to give effect to its rules over lesser 
laws. 167 Invested with this vast power making them the "third giant" of the 
State,168 judges since that time have continued to extend their prerogative, as 
much through judicial fiat as through procedures of judicial review. 169 Such has 
been the case with judges not only on the level of the federal Su preme c'0urt, but 
in jurisdictions at all levels. Composed of nine justices, whose appointments 
harbor an undeniably political element which influences subsequent jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court occupies within this structure the role of supreme 
arbiter. Through stare decisis, a law which has been declared unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court ceases to exist, in a manner of speaking, without even having 
been officially repealed by the legislature, and the rule thereby laid down is the 
law which all the states must follow. 170 
The surprising extent to which the powers of judicial review have expanded is 
165. See W. GLANVILLE, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (London, Faber 1958); 
Callahan, The Sanctity of Life, in UPDATING LIFE AND DEATH (D. R. Cutler ed. 1968); R. MacCormick, The 
Quality of Life, the Sanctity of Life, HASTINGS CENTER REpORT, 8, I, (1978) 30-36; A. Shaw, Defining the 
Qunlity of Life, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 5" II (1977); E. Keyserlinck, Le caractere sacre de la vie ou 
la qualite de la vie (Commission de RHorme du Droit du Canada, Serie Protection de la Vie, Doc. 
d'Etude (1979». 
166. The author has relied on the following works: L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (New 
York 1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]; S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN]; A. MASSON & A. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES (1972). 
167. See A. Tunc, Le controle tk la constitutionalite des loi awe Etats-Unis, in ACTUAUTE DU CONTROLE 
jURISDICTIONNEL DES LOIS, ACTES DES VIesjOURNEES D'ETUDES jURIDIQUES JEAN DABIN 17-41 (Brussels, 
Larder 1973). 
168. M. Cappelletti, Necessite et legitimite tk lajustice constitutionnelle, 1981 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE 
DROIT COMPARE 625, 626-57. 
169. See G. BURDEAU, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES (Paris, Librairie Generale 
de Droit et Jurisprudence 1969) [hereinafter cited as BURDEAU]. 
170. !d. at 102. 
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of particular interest to the European observer. 171 Judicial reviews goes beyond 
direct review over matters pertaining to the rights and indivdual freedoms which 
the Constitution guarantees in the first ten amendments, in effect since 1791,172 
and in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, added in the wake 
of the Civil War with the objective of protecting the citizenry against the states 
themselves. The Supreme Court has drastically extended the scope of judicial 
review over both federal and state law, through expansive interpretation of two 
general clauses: the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, which 
the Court has furthermore combined to a maximum of efficiency. 
The Due Process of Law Clause, contained in the fifth amendment173 and also 
appearing in the fourteenth amendment,174 provides that "no person shall be 
deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law." Originally 
designed to guarantee the right to a fair trial in the pure tradition of English 
criminal law, this clause has been interpreted by federal as well as state au-
thorities as imposing upon the legislator the duty to legislate in a "reasonable" 
manner, for fear of unjustly depriving citizens of their freedom or property. 
Judges are thus, by necessity, led to examine the substantive quality of the law in 
view of what they consider to be reasonable and what they believe to be consis-
tent with the concepts of freedom and property.175 
The Equal Protection of the Laws Clause contained in the fourteenth amend-
ment was originally designed to prevent discrimination against the black popula-
tion. The Clause has been combined with the Due Process Clause to prohibit all 
forms of unjustifiable discrimination176 which constitute a violation of substan-
171. Professor Tribe sets forth seven successive models in discussing this development. For the 
philosophical scope of these successive methods of interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, see 
W. FRIEDMAN, THEORIE GENERALE DU DROIT 89-101 (Paris, Ubrairie Generale de Droit etJurisprudence 
1965). 
172. Involved are essentially the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments. The first ten 
amendments only affect the federal government and Congress, but do not limit the sovereignty of the 
states. See CORWIN, supra note 166, at 285. 
173. The Fifth Amendment States: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
174. The Fourteenth Amendment states in Section I: 
All persons born on naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
See TRIBE, supra note 166 at 413-26. The Court, until 1954, tolerated organized racial segregation by the 
states. Until 1937 the Court opposed any economic and social regulation by the states by virtue of the 
contract clause. 
175. See CORWIN, supra note 166, at 386-90 and 461 et seq. 
176. This clause is comparable to Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
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tive due process. l77 It is interesting to note that the word "liberty," which initially 
dealt exclusively with the concept of physical freedom, has been used by the 
Court to expand the scope of due process to include not only freedoms which the 
Constitution expressly protects, but also rights which the Constitution has not 
expressly provided for and which the Court has progressively found to exist in 
the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights. 17B Moreover, the Court, 
in developing the theory of the so-called "fundamental" rights and freedoms, a 
rather fluid criterion,179 has articulated special tests of particular strigency, such 
as "strict scrutiny." Under strict scrutiny, a law which infringes upon one of these 
fundamental rights is presumed to be a priori unconstitutional, whereas normally 
the opposite is the rule. The state then has the burden of demonstrating that the 
law is based on a compelling state interest and not excessively broad. In the usual 
case, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the law is "unreasonable" 
under the rationality test. 180 As a general rule, the state loses when the test is that 
of compelling interest and wins when the applicable test is that of rationality. I 81 
Thus, the crux of the problem is knowing what the Court will decide to consider 
as a "fundamental right" on the basis of textual provsions of the Constitution or 
its "emanations." 
Needless to say, the reach of these powers inevitably tempts judges to play the 
role of a super legislature which can be limited only by their own caution and 
wisdom. The vagueness of certain constitutional provisions, these "glorious 
ambiguities,"182 furthermore permits judges to apply not the text, but the spirit 
of the Constitution, guided by their own conceptions or by what they believe the 
times require. Finding support in the individualist ideas infused throughout the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court long defended the postulates of economic 
liberalism against legislative efforts to tentatively introduce more social justice 
into American society, and notably opposed the New Deal policies of President 
Roosevelt. 183 Since the Supreme Court's stunning reversal in attitude in the 1937 
177. It is thus that the equal protection clause, which does not appear in the fifth amendment, has 
been applied to the federal government. See CORWIN, supra note 166, at 390; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 
497 (1954); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). 
178. See CORWIN, supra note 166, at 387,440-42; TRIBE, supra note 166, at 564 et seq. 
179. Consider the following definitions: rights implicit in those "fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 
312, 316 (1926); "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); "rights implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S .. 319 (1937). See also CORWIN, supra note 166, at 474; 
TRIBE, supra note 166, at 564. 
180. See CORWIN, supra note 160, at 306 and 493; TRIBE, supra note 166 at 1000. See also Gunther, In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, a Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 8 
(1972). See also Bates v. uttle Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1959); MacLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 
(1964). 
181. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976). 
182. Hufstedler, In the Name of Justice, 14 STAN. LAW. 3, 4 (1979). 
183. In effect, until 1937 the Court protected essentially the right to property, interpreting the term 
"liberty" as meaning "liberty to contract," in order to systematically combat the social and economic laws 
of Congress and the states. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905); Atkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
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decision of West Coast Hotel v, Parrish, 184 the Supreme Court has shown greater 
self-restraint in economic and social matters, but appears since then to use its 
powers of interpretation and creation largely in the area of civil liberties and, 
more specifically, in the matter of privacy, which is precisely the focus of our 
interest. [85 
B. The Ambiguities of the Rights of Privacy: Privacy (Intimite) or Self~Determination 
(Autodetermination)? [86 
Americanjurisprudence and doctrine, and in certain states, legislation, did not 
wait until the 1960's to come to the protection of a certain sphere of privacy 
threatened by either individuals or excessive state incursion and investigation 
into private lives. Beginning with the famous article by Brandeis and Warren,t87 
the law of torts has gradually formulated a right of reparation to remedy a 
wrong unknown under the common law - the invasion of privacy - which is 
appearing in increasingly diversified forms. [88 The Constitution should lend 
itself just as easily, moreover, to the protection of the citizen against unwarranted 
intrusion by the public authorities as against third persons with regard to certain 
areas of privacy or freedom. The two concepts of freedom and privacy are 
closely allied, particularly when the expansive interpretation and application of 
the first and fourteenth amendments, as well as the Due Process Clause of the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments, are involved. [89 Nonetheless, not until 1965 
did the Court hold that the "right of privacy" was a fundamental, independent 
right which emanated from the Bill of Rights. The implications of this decision 
are the more serious in that the content of this right, whose basis remains 
obscure and controversial, is so fleeting and imprecise. Is it a right to privacy in 
the sense of intimacy (intimite) which is at issue? Or a right to freedom? And 
which freedom? How far does such right extend?[90 
The scope of these questions is clearly perceptible throughout the decisions 
which follow, starting with the decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, rendered May 
184. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
185. TRIBE, supra note 166, at 564; CORWIN, supra note 166, at 389-90, 466. 
186. See Privacy, 31 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS No.2 (1966); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM (1967); THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY, A SYMPOSIUM ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF GRISWOLD V. CONNECT-
ICUT, (1971); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1972); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUMN. 
L. REv. 1410, 1411-33 (1974); Kurland, Some Reflections on Privacy and the Constitution, ALUMNI MAGAZINE 
7 (1976); Gross, The Concept of Privacy 42 N.V.U. L. REv. 34 (1967); Parker, The Definition of Privacy, 27 
RUTGERS L. REv., 275 (1973); Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975); Reinan, 
Privacy Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26 (176); Rigaux, L'e/aboration d:un right of privacy 
dans La jurisprudence Americaine, 1980 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 701-30 [hereinafter 
cited as L'etaboration]. 
187. Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193-220 (1880-1881). 
188. See W. Wagner, Le droit a l'intimiti aux Etats-Unis, 1965 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
COMPARE 365-76; W. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383-42 (1960); L'eLaboration, supra note 186. 
189. See the examples cited by Rigaux in L'etaboration, supra note 186; TRIBE, supra note 166, at 576. 
190. For an attempt towards defining the content of this right, see TRIBE, supra note 166, at 886-990; 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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7, 1965 by the Supreme Court of the United States, which for the first time 
officially declared that a right of privacy exists. 
1. The Griswold Decision and the Right to Marital Privacy191 
Were it not for its landmark ruling, the Griswold decision would be itself of 
little interest in that it declares unconstitutional a law of rare absurdity. Since 
1879, the state of Connecticut had prohibited all persons, married or single, the 
use of contraceptives - but not their sale, distribution or advertising. However, 
the general laws relating to complicity impose the same sanctions on those who 
"assist, encourage, advise, incite or command another to commit a crime," 
making the contraceptive law applicable to those who disseminate information or 
furnish contraceptives. It was on this basis that the director of a family planning 
center and the doctor of this center were prosecuted for having advised and 
furnished a married couple with contraceptives. The accused invoked the Due 
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment as a defense, alleging that the 
Connecticut law violated the rights of the married couple. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and a majority of seven justices, in an opinion written by Justice 
Douglas, declared the Connecticut law unconstitutional. 192 
Several essential elements can be distilled from this decision. The first element 
is the judicial construction of a new "fundamental right" not expressly provided 
in the Constitution, nor in its amendments: the right of privacy. Interestingly, 
Justice Douglas, in justifying its creation, pointed to the "pneumbra of the Bill of 
Rights" and the "emanations" from its guarantees, whereas the other justices of 
the majority invoked various other bases.193 Justices Black and Stewart, in dis-
senting opinions, argued that the Court had trampled upon the prerogatives of 
the legislature as a constitutional matter, including the police power of the 
states. 194 The second element is the shifting of the burden of proof to the state, 
which must demonstrate a "compelling interest" to the state each time a violation 
of this new right has been alleged. Finally, the third element is the apparently 
cautious and limited scope of the decision. At issue was not so much the freedom 
191. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and 
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, MICH. L. REv. 197-218 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Kauper]; McKay, 
Tile Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, MICH. L. REv. 259-82 (1965); Sutherland, Privacy in 
Connecticut, MICH. L. REv. 213-88 (1965); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of Doctrine, MICH. L. REV. 
219-34 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]. 
192. The same law had been challenged some years before without success, the court refusing to hear 
the matter. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). See also Tilestone v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
193. See Emerson, supra note 191, at 228; Kauper, supra note 191, at 242-48. 
194. Use of such broad, unbounded judicial authority would make of this Court's members 
a day-to-day constitutional convention .... Subjecting Federal and State laws to such an 
unrestrained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactment 
would jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that the Farmers set up, and at the 
same time threaten to take away much of the power of States to govern themselves which the 
Constitution plainly intended them to have. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520-21 (1965) (dissenting opinion). 
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to practice contraception, and thus whether or not to procreate, and was even 
less the freedom to distribute information and contraceptives. Rather, the deci-
sion stands for the inviolability of the home and marital privacy, which the 
justices considered to be indisputably beyond the investigatory powers of the 
state in its quest to ensure respect for the law. 195 In contrast, the justices 
repeatedly insisted this right of privacy could not be invoked as a shield against 
laws relative to adultery, homosexuality or other forms of sexual misconduct,196 
with Justice Douglas lauding the sacred character of marriage. 197 However, since 
1965 commentators have discerned the potential for further extension of a 
concept "even more subjective than those of freedom and justice."198 
2. The Decision of Eisenstadt v. Baird and the Right to Choose in the Matter of 
Procreation 
Seven years later, in 1972, the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird l99 settled 
the uncertainty hovering over the concept of "right of privacy," and in the 
process decisively enlarged its reach. The issue concerned a Massachusetts law, 
modified following the Griswold decision, which regulated not the use of con-
traceptives, but rather their distribution and sale, while discriminating between 
married couples and single persons. Justice Brennan, expressing the majority 
opinion, declared the Massachusetts law unconstitutional, on the following ra-
tionale: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in 
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an indepen-
dent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of 
two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeu p. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 
Thus, the right of marital privacy, the initial object of the right of privacy, was 
abandoned in favor of an individual right to freedom of choice, decision and 
action in matters which so fundamentally affect the individual as the freedom to 
procreate. The Supreme Court, invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, rejected the argument that the fact of not being married 
195. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred 
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to 
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship .... "). 
196. See the concurring opinion of Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 498, and 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, 318 U.S. at 553. 
197. "Marriage is a coming together for better and for worse hopefully enduring, and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486. 
198. See Emerson, supra note 191, at 228. 
199. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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should affect the applicability of this right. In the wake of this case, the Supreme 
Court, in the 1977 decision of Carrey v. Population Services International, ruled that 
the use of contraceptives by and their sale to single minors under the age of 
sixteen years could not be made illega1.20o 
The right to choose not to procreate could include as well the right to volun-
tary sterilization for purely contraceptive purposes. Although the Supreme 
Court has yet to rule on this question, it now appears that states accept that the 
right of privacy includes the right to contraception in all its forms. 201 Logically, 
the right of privacy should run counter to eugenic sterilization, imposed upon 
mentally or physically deficient persons. 202 Long before the Griswold decision, 
the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of an eugenic law imposing 
sterilization upon certain categories of criminals or incompetents. However, a 
more recent case, Skinner v. Oklahoma, came down in favor of the free right to 
procreation.203 This issue today stands out as one of the thornier problems, in 
that the eugenic laws are no longer in accord with the growing respect for 
individual rights. The solutions to these questions are thus being sought in terms 
ofthe "best interest" ofthe interested party and in the latter's presumed consent, 
or at least in the substitution of such consent by third parties expressed under 
conditions which furnish adequate guarantees of sufficient objectivity. It remains 
unclear, however, whether the compelling interest of the state might here be 
determinative. 204 
200. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See Isaacs, The Law oj Fertility 
Regulation in the United States: A 1980 Review, 19 J. FAM. L 65 (1980-1981) [hereinafter cited as Isaacs]. 
20 I. See Isaacs, supra note 200, at 79; see also Tierney, Voluntary Sterilization, A Necessary Alternative, 4 
FAM. L. Q. 373 (1970); Pitts, Sexual Sterilization: A New Rationale7 20 ARK. L. REv. 353 (1972-1973); 
McKensie, Contraceptive Sterilization: The Doctor, the Patient, arul the United States Constitution, 25 FLA. L. 
REv. 327 (1972-1973); Myers, Comments, A Constitutional Evaluation oj Statutory arul Administrative Impedi-
ments to Voluntary Sterilization, 14 J. FAM. L 67-84 (1975-1976). See also Stepan, The World's Laws 
Concerning Voluntary SterilizationJor Family Planning Purposes, 3 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 72 (1973); Kouri, The 
Legality oj Purely Contraceptive Sterilization, SHERBROOKE U. L. REv. I (1976-1977). The Supreme Court of 
Canada has recognized the legality of purely contraceptive sterilization in Cataford v. Moreau, C.S. 933 
(1978). 
202. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
203. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
204. See Isaacs, supra note 200, at 81-86; Neuwirth, Meisler & Goldrich, Capacity, Competence, Consent: 
Voluntary Sterilization oj Mentally Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 447 (1974-1975); Price & Burt, 
Nonconsensual Procedures and the Right to Privacy, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAw 
94-112 (M. Kindred ed. 1976); Dunn, Eugenic Sterilization on Statutes: A Constitutional Reevaluation, 14 J. 
FAM. L 280-303 (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as Dunn]; Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit, Is Sterilization the 
Answer1 27 OHIO ST. L. REV. 591 (1966); J. ROBITSCHER, EUGENIC STERIUZATION (1973). In 1976,24 
states still had eugenic sterilization laws which had not been declared unconstitutional. See Dunn, supra, 
at 280-81. 
On the other hand, regulations of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as 
amended February 6, 1979 prohibit the use of federal funds for the sterilization of persons below the 
age of 21, the mentally incompetent and persons in internment. 
In Canada, see La sterilisation et les personnes souffrant de handicaps mentaux (Commission de 
RHorme du Droit du Canada, Doc. de Trav. No. 24 (1979». For an intriguing plea in favor of the 
constitutionality of a law aimed at controlling population by imposing sterilization upon every person 
having two children, see Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices arul Dilemmas, 41 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 529 (1972). 
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Just as curiously, the Supreme Court has yet to extend the right of privacy to 
"sexual preferences," notably homosexuality.205 The attitude of the Court ap-
pears ambivalent in this area, as though it were hesitating between protecting a 
right to self-determination pure and simple in matters of sexuality, and protect-
ing old puritan and family values,206 while the neo-malthusian mentality, further 
exacerbated by the sudden awareness of a threatening population explosion on 
the one hand, and an indefinite growth in the costs of maintaining a welfare state 
on the other, is more reconcilable with the latter factors than the concern 
over privacy. 
Following in the footsteps of the Eisenstadt decision is a matter different yet 
related to that of contraception: the issue of abortion, to which the above 
explanation may equally apply. The Supreme Court, on January 22, 1973, 
handed down two decisive decisions, Roe v. Wade and Roe v. Bolton. 207 
3. Roe v. Wade and the Right to Abortion 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court directly applied the principle that freedom 
of decision in matters so fundamental as the right to choose whether or not to 
procreate is included in the right of privacy. At issue was a Texas law which 
prohibited abortion except where it was needed to save the life of the mother. 
The appellant, who was not married, argued that the law violated her right of 
privacy without due process. The state of Texas contended that the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the fourteenth amendment should protect the 
fetus against the arbitrary suppression of his life. The Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Blackmun, expressly rejected the argument that an 
unborn child could have the quality of "person" protected under the Constitu-
tion. The rationale was based on an historical analysis which demonstrated that 
the common law had never recognized the unborn child as a subject of law, and 
that the state laws prohibiting abortion were enacted subsequent to the Constitu-
tion. Those laws were aimed at the protection of the health of the mother. In 
addition, the majority decided that it did not have to express an opinion on what 
constitutes the beginning of life, nor did it have to take sides in favor of one or 
more "theories of life." The Court, after an examination of the various amend-
ments and articles ofthe Constitution dealing with the word "person," concluded 
that none of them, notably least of all the fourteenth amendment, applied to the 
205. Other federal and state courts, however, appear divided on this point and it is unlikely that any 
islands of resistance will survive. See TRIBE, supra note 166, at 941-48; Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy 
Based Tluiory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond tlui Ideology of Familial Privacy, HARV. CIV. RTS. - CIV. 
LIBERTIES L. REV. 361-84 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Eichbaum]; Richards, Unnatural Acts and tlui 
Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1976-1977); Rivera, Our 
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in America, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799-955 
(1979). 
206. See Eichbaum, supra note 205. See also Richards, Tlui Individual, tlui Family and tlui Constitution: A 
Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-62 (1980). 
207. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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fetus. The Court consequently recognized that the mother's right of privacy is 
large enough to encompass the right to terminate her pregnancy. This right is 
not, however, absolute, and may clash after a certain point with the compelling 
interests of the state. Such compelling interests include protecting the health of 
the mother beginning with the second trimester of pregnancy, and protecting a 
potential life, beginning with the moment the baby is viable, namely, capable of 
living an independent, meaningful existence. The states thus retain the power, 
but not the duty, to regulate the medical conditions relating to abortion begin-
ning with the second trimester, and to prohibit abortion beginning with the third 
trimester, absent danger to the health or life of the mother. In contrast, during 
the first trimester, the mother and her physician have the sole power of decision. 
On a technical level, it is interesting to note that the decision of Justice 
Blackmun, in the view of critics pro and con, is based on an obsolete, if not 
inexact, analysis of the common law, state law and jurisprudence relative to 
unborn children, and on a questionable constitutional framework. 208 The com-
mon law of inheritancy has, in fact, historically recognized the maxim infans 
conceptus209 and recent Anglo-American jurisprudence in civil matters clearly 
tends to grant rights to children in seeking remedy for prenatal injury and even 
as to the injury occurring before viability.21t1 Again, historically speaking, it is 
incorrect to claim that the numerous anti-abortion laws enacted in the mid-
nineteenth century, before the adoption in 1868 of the fourteenth amendment, 
were aimed solely at protecting the health of the woman, and not of the unborn 
child.211 Finally, it was clearly erroneous to claim that, as of the date of the 
decision in 1973, the right to freedom of decision relative to abortion was "a 
principle of justice so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of the 
people that it can be viewed as fundamental."212 Equally false was the assertion 
that a state may limit individual freedoms only on the condition that the state 
prove that another constitutional right is being threatened.213 Notwithstanding 
208. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Ely]; Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name, The Abortion Cases, SUP. CT. 
REV. 154 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Epstein]; Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. 
Wade and its Critics, 53 B. U. L. REv. 765 (1973); Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on 
Abortion, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 807 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Byrn]. 
209. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, § 175 (Jones ed. 1915); Brodie, The New Biology and the Unborn 
Child, 9]. FAM. L. 391 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Brodie]; Deleuery, La condition prenatale, fa midecine 
et Ie droit, in Le corps humain et fa droit, 26 TRAVAUX DE L'ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT 57-86 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Deleuery]; Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 C.L.]. 76 (1942-1944). 
210. See Brodie, supra note 209, at 392-93; Kruger, Wrongful Death and the Unborn: An Examination of 
Recovery after Roe v. Wade, 13]. FAM. L. 99-114 (1973-1974); Veitch, Delicta in Interum, 24 N. IR. LEG. Q. 
66. See also the British Law Commission Working Paper, No. 47, Injuries to Unborn Children (Jan. 19, 
1973). 
211. Byrn, supra note 208, at 826. As of 1868, 28 states out of 37 had enacted laws prohibiting 
abortion before "quickening." 
212. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 171 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). 
213. Ely, supra note 208, at 926. 
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the expressed intent of the majority to the contrary, the Court once again, in the 
name of substantive due process, appears to have done nothing less than engage 
in 'judicial legislation," a power identical to that which the Court had appropri-
ated for itself during the Lochner era of economic and social reform. 214 
Especially interesting is the fact that the Court chose not to couch its rationale 
in terms of medical, social or economic agruments in favor of the mother's right 
of privacy and her right to exercise dominion over herself and her destiny. 
Rather, the Court refused to accord the unborn child the legal status of "per-
son." This denial of legal protection is strangely reminiscent of the denial to a 
black slave of his status as a person, achieved by the Supreme Court one hundred 
years before in the infamous and tragic Dred Scott decision. 215 Enacted in the 
wake of the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment was supposed to forever bar 
discrimination of this sort, on the part of the legislature as much as on the part of 
the Supreme Court itself. The Court does not indicate, however, why a state may 
not decide to extend its protection to cover a child at a less developed stage. 216 It 
is difficult to see what should prevent a democratic, civilized society from protect-
ing such existence, even if the fetus has yet to attain the status of "person" in its 
own right, 217 and even if its dependence upon the mother might permit excep-
tions otherwise unthinkable.218 Recommendation 874 of the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe on a European Charter of the Rights of the 
Child provides in this regard an interesting comparison: "The rights of every 
child to life from the moment of conception, to shelter, to suitable nourishment 
and to an adequate environment should be recognized and the national Gov-
ernments should accept the obligation to do everything possible to permit the 
integral application of these rights."219 The fact that six courts of highest juris-
diction in the West have decided differently on the right of the unborn child to 
legislative or constitutional protection illustrates the fluctuating and supremely 
subjective nature of the juridical person subject to legal protection. 220 
214. See id. at 937-43; Epstein, supra note 208. See also the dissenting opinions of Justices Rehnquist 
and White in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 171,221. 
215. "We think ... the people of the negro race ... are not included and were not intended to be 
included under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (19 How. 
1857); MASSON & BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES 37 (5th ed.). 
216. See TRIBE, supra note 166, at 927. 
217. "[AJ fetus is live enough not to be dead, not yet mature enough to be an infant, yet a human 
being enough to deserve protection .... " P. RAMSEY, ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH, cited in Deleury, supra 
note 212, at 62. 
218. See Brodie, supra note 209, at 403; Glenn, TIw Constitulional Validity of Abortion Legislation: A 
Comparative Note, MCGILL L.J. 673-84 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Glenn]. Cf Doe v. Israel, 482 F.2d 156 
(1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 993 (1974), which declared unconstitutional a Rhode Island law 
providing that life begins at conception and that the infant is a "person" from such moment on under 
the fourteenth amendment. 
219. Text adopted by the Assembly on Oct. 14, 1979 (10th Session). See also the discussions contained 
in Document 4376 of the Report of the Commission on questions relating to social and health matters, 
Point VI of the Recommendation. 
220. In addition to Roe v. Wade, see the decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court of Oct. II, 
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The U.S. Supreme Court was to later confront state laws which conflicted less 
with the Constitution than with the Court's own doctrine.221 Thus, the Court 
inter alia declared unconstitutional a new law of Missouri which required the 
consent of the husband to his wife's abortion and which, in the case of a minor 
under 18 years of age, required the consent of its parents or guardian. The law 
also prohibited certain methods of abortion and obligated physicians to do 
everything possible to safeguard the life of the fetus, without regard to viabil-
ity.222 
On the other hand, the Court has not had occasion within the framework of 
the right of privacy to convey the right of a single woman to artificial insemina-
tion. Certain authors nonetheless believe that this right is a logical consequence 
of the Eisenstadt and Roe decisions, and of the right to voluntarily procreate or 
choose not to do SO.223 This point of view is debatable. 224 The Roe decision is 
1974, Europaische Grundrechte-ZeitschriJt 74 (1975) (declaring that termination of pregnancy was compat-
ible with the Austrian Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, the latter 
protecting the individual only against interference from the state and not from private persons); the 
decision of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of Feb. 25, 1975, 39 BvergE 
1-95 (unconstitutional); the decision ofthe French Conseil Constitutionel of Jan. 15, 1975, [1975] Dalloz 2, 
529, note Hamon (upholding French law on termination of pregnancy as compatible with the French 
Constitution); the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court of Feb. 18, 1975, Europaische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift 162-65 (1975) (declaring unconstitutional Article 546 of the Italian Penal Code to the extent 
the law prohibited abortion where the health of the mother was in danger); the decision of Morgentaler 
v. the Queen, 53 D.L.R. 3d 161 (S.C.C. 1975) (the Supreme Court of Canada declaring provisions in 
Article 251 of the Criminal Code compatible with the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Code limiting 
abortion to cases where the life or health of the mother is in danger). See Glenn, supra note 218; 
Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United Stales and West Germany, 25 AM. J. CaMP. L. 255-85 (1977). 
221. See L'tlaboration, supra note 186, at 720 n.28 (1980). The resistance of the states to the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision and the talk of amending the Constitution to overturn the decision almost ten 
years after it was rendered show that the dust has far from settled. See 7 FAM. L. REp. 2759 (BNA 
Oct. 13, 1981) (Senate Panel Begins Consideration of Constitutional Amendment on Abortion). 
222. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Moss, 
Abortion Statutes after Danforth: An Examinalion, 15 J. FAM. L. 535 (1976-1977). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 
428 U.S. 132 (1976); McGilvray, Baird v. Bellotti: Abortion, The Minor's Right to Decide, 33 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 705 (1979). Compare the Court's apology for marriage in Griswold with its upholding the constitu-
tional right of parents to control the education of their children in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). As to the refusal to recognize the rights of 
the husband and father to be consulted and to protect the rights of the unborn child, see in England, 
Paton v. Trustees of B.P.A.S., 2 All E. R. 987 (1978). See also Lynch & Bennett, Abortion, Whose Decision7 
18 FAM. L. 35 (1979); Lynch & Bennett, Abortion, the Female, the Fetus and the Father, 37 CURRENT LEGAL 
PROD. 217 (1979). See also O'Neill & Watson, The Father and the Unborn Child, MOD. L. REv. 174 (1975). 
223. See Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 19 J. FAM. L. 331 (1979-1980); Curri-Cohen, 
CUTTent Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979). 
224. Article 2 of the Proposal on the Artificial Insemination of Human Beings, by the Council of 
Europe, does not absolutely exclude the question of artificial insemination of an unmarried woman, 
although providing that insemination should not be practiced unless appropriate conditions exist to 
ensure the well-being of the future child. Since Article 7, section 2 of the same proposal prohibits 
establishing the legal filiation between the child and the donor, a provision allowing an unmarried 
woman to get artificial insemination would be incompatible with Article 2 of the European Convention 
Relative to the Legal Situation of Children Born out of Wedlock, under which the paternal filiation of 
every child born outside of marriage can be recognized, and with the interpretation of the European 
Court of Human Rights of Article 8 of the Convention in the Marckx decision of 1979 (child's right to 
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applicable as well to fetal experimentation conducted in the United States,22:l 
Finally, before concluding this discussion, it perhaps may be appropriate to 
make a brief comparison between the jurisprudence in this area fashioned by the 
U,S. Supreme Court and two recent decisions of the European Commission on 
Human Rights. In Bruggeman & Scheuten,226 two German nationals alleged that 
the new West German law restricting abortion upon request227 violated Article 8 
of the Convention and their right to privacy, in that the complainants were 
obliged either to abstain from sexual relations or to practice contraception, or to 
bring into the world an unwanted child. The Commission unanimously dis-
missed the claim, on the ground that pregnancy and its termination is not solely a 
matter of the private life of the pregnant woman, which is closely associated with 
the developing fetus. The Commission, however, did not find it necessary to 
examine whether the unborn child must be considered as an entity under Article 
8, section 2, which provides for "the protection of others." The Commission thus 
feels that every law governing the termination of pregnancy does not constitute 
an incursion into the private life of the mother. The Commission also believes 
that Article 8, section 1 cannot in principle signify that pregnancy and its 
termination are matters pertaining exclusively to the private rights of the 
mother.228 
On the other hand, the Commission in X v. United Kingdom,229 dismissed the 
claim of an Englishman as unfounded under Article 2. The wife had obtained an 
abortion pursuant to the Abortion Act of 1967 against the wishes of her hus-
normal familial relations). See Meulders-Klein, Les droits du peTe en matiere de procreation, de filiation et 
d'autoriti parentale dans les legislations recentes, colloquim, LEs PERES D'AUJOURD'HUI, organized by the 
Conseil Superieure de l'Information Sexuelle et de I'Education Familiale, Paris, February 17-19, 1981 
(to be completed, Stock, ed.); see also, M. ReviJIard, in LAW AND ETHICS OF A.J.D. AND EMBRYO TRANSFER, 
81 (Ciba Foundation 1973); De Cooman van Kan, L'insemination artificielle, recommandation du Conseil de 
l'Europe et perspectives de la reglementation belge (etude de droit compare), JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX 369, 
370-81, (1981). For a severe critique of the proposal ofthe Council of Europe, see also Giesen, Heterologe 
Insemination: Ein Neues Legislatorisches Problem' Zu Einer Gesetzgebungsinitiative des Europarats, FAM. R.Z. 
413 (1981). The European Assembly rejected the proposal, submitted to it on Oct. 1 and 2, 1981. 
225. See Hellegers, Fetal Research, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, 489-93 (1978). As to regulation 
of experimentation on living and dead fetuses see the Recommendations of the National Commission 
for the Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Research on the Fetus, Report and 
Recommendations, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare Publications No. (OS) 76-127 and Appen-
dix to No. (OS) 76-128, and federal regulations adopted by the Department contained in 40 Fed. Reg. 
33, 528 (1975), 45 C.F.R. § 46, 201-211 (1976); Friedman, The Federal Fetal Experimentation Regulations: 
An Establishment Clause Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REv. 676 (1976-1977). Paradoxically, these regulations 
attempt to treat the fetus in intero destined for abortion as a human subject, recommending that the 
experimentation not harm or expose the fetus to risk of harm. As to fetal experimentation in Great 
Britain, see The Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material for Research: Report of the Advisory Group, the Peel 
Commission Report, D.H.S.S., 1972, Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 
226. Bruggeman & Scheuten v. Federal Rep. Germany, Report of the European Commission on 
Human Rights, July 12, 1977; Resolution DH (78) I, of the Committee of Ministers, Mar. 17, 1978. 
227. Fifteenth law reforming the Penal Code, Law of 21 May 1976. 
228. Opinion of the Commission, §§ 54-65. 
229. Request No. 8.416-78. Opinion of the Commission of May 13, 1980. See M. Blois, Abortus en de 
Artikel2 van de Europese Conventie voor de Ruhten van de Mens, NED. ]URISTENBLAD 141 (1980). 
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band, who alleged that this act violated both Article 2, in denying the right to life 
of his unborn child, and Article 8, in violating respect for the husband's own 
private life. The Commission, after noting that the Convention, no less than the 
U.S. Constitution, does not define the terms "person" or "life," held that the 
word "person" can only be applied to individuals already born, in view of the 
other provisions of the Convention. 230 In examining the word "life," the Com-
mission held that in the absence of any provision to the contrary, Article 2 could 
not guarantee an absolute right to life for the fetus, since too many exceptions 
have long endured. The Commission, however, did not discuss the inverse 
hypothesis - whether the fetus had no right to life at all - and decided that 
Article 2 is not violated by an abortion based on protecting the life and health of 
the mother.231 The Commission then decided that under these circumstances 
the right of the husband and future father to his family had not been violated 
and must yield before the right of his wife to her private life, as delineated by the 
Bruggeman decision. 232 The Commission appears to have ignored Recommenda-
tion 874 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
4. The Quinlan Decision and the Right to Die233 
The Quinlan decision concerns the right to freely decide to die. This decision 
was handed down not by the Supreme Court of the United States, but by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, onJanuary 26, 1976.234 The tragic story of Karen 
Quinlan is known universally. On April 15, 1975 this twenty-two year old woman 
was hos pitalized in a coma, caused by a prolonged res piratory arrest of unknown 
origin. Despite all efforts, Karen was to remain in a persistent vegetative state, 
characterized by a state of total unconsciousness, yet accompanied by certain 
neurological activity. Clinically, Karen Quinlan was alive, but had lost all cogni-
tive functions. Her vital functions were themselves only maintained through 
intravenous feeding and a respirator. Her father, after enduring several months 
230. Opinion of the Commission, §§ 7-9. Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
231. Opinion of the Commission, §§ 10-24. 
232. [d., §§ 25-27. 
233. See BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW, U. Humber & R. Almeder eds. 1976), especially pages 
423-53,2 and 533-38; E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969); A. DOWNING, EUTHANASIA AND THE 
RIGHT TO DIE (1970); K. BINDING & A. Hoc HE, THE RELEASE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF LIFE DEVOID OF 
VALUE (1975); A. DOWNING, EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH (1977); P. SEINFELS & R. VEATCH, 
DEATH INSIDE OUT, (1974); H. TROWELL, THE UNF1NISHED DEBATE ON EUTHANASIA (1973); D. HO~AN 
& D. MALL, DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA (1977); H. KOHL, THE MORAUTY OF KILUNG (1974); 
G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1958); Kamisar, Some Nonreligious Views 
against Proposed "Mercy Killing Legislation", 42 MINN. 1.. REv. 969 (1958); G. Williams, Euthanasia, 42 MED. 
LEGIs. J. 14 (1973); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE (1978). In Canada, see Commission de 
RHorme du Droit du Canada, Serie Protection de la Vie, Euthanasie, Aide au Suicide et Interruption de 
Traitement, Doc. de Travail No. 28 (1981); KEYSERLINCK, LE CARACTERE SACRE DE LA VIE (Document 
d'Etude, Serie Protection de la Vie, 1973), INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE SUR 'INTERPRETATION CONTEM-
PORAINE DE L'HOMME, DEF1NITION DE LA MORT ET EUTHANASIE (University of Sudbury 1975). 
234. 70 N.]. 10,355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
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of treatment and having concluded that his daughter's state was irreversible, 
requested that Karen's doctors halt her artificial respiration, with the belief that 
this treatment would end his daughter's life. However, the doctors refused on 
the grounds that the patient could not be considered dead under the criteria set 
by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard School of Medicine regarding the 
death of the brain.235 Joseph Quinlan then sought relief before a Superior Court 
of New Jersey, requesting that he be designated guardian of his daughter and 
given the authorization of the court to order a halt to the respirator. Mr. Quinlan 
invoked the constitutional guarantees of the first amendment, notably the free-
dom of religion clause, as well as the right of privacy recognized by the Griswold 
and Roe decisions, and the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment. The New Jersey Superior Court dismissed his complaint 
on the grounds that the state had a preponderant interest in protecting life 
despite the right of privacy and freedom of religion, and that the eighth 
amendment applied only to criminal punishment. In addition, the court refused 
to designate Joseph Quinlan as guardian of his daughter and appointed another 
in his place, who then refused authorization to disconnect the respirator. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower court's decision. Reject-
ing freedom of religion and the eighth amendment as an argument, the Court 
held that Karen Quinlan had the right to decide herself, under her right of 
privacy, whether to suspend her treatment. The Court also recognized the right 
of her father as guardian to express this wish in her name, after consulting the 
family, her physicians and the ethics committee of the hospital on the likelihood 
of Karen ever regaining consciousness. It was then decided that the respirator be 
disconnected. Karen, however, did not die. She spontaneously began to breathe, 
and is still alive as of the date this is written. The dramatic Quinlan case raises a 
number of problems with respect to the right to decide on one's own death, 
which must be clearly distinguished. 
a. Determining the Moment of Death236 
The first problem concerns the definition and determination of death, namely, 
the moment when a person may be medically and legally declared to be de-
ceased, such that a voluntary discontinuation of medical treatment cannot be 
235. A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical SCMol to 
Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 J.A.M.A. 335 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Report]. 
236. See Les criteres de la determination de la mort, (Commission de RHorme du Droit du Canada, 
Serie Protection de la Vie, Doc. No. 23, 1979, and Bibliography at 71); INsTITuT DE RECHERCHE SUR 
L'INERPRETATION CONTEMPORAINE DE L'HOMME, La definition de la mort (University of Sudbury 1975). In 
the nited States, see Report, supra note 235; CAPRON & KASS, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for 
Dete ining Human Death: An Appraisal and Proposal in Biomedical Ethics and the Law, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87 
(1972); Veith, Brain Death and Organ Transplantation, ANN. N. Y. ACAD. SCI. 417 (1978). In England,see 
Diagnosis of Brain Death: Statement Issued by the Secretary of the Conference of Medical Royal Colleges and their 
Faculties in the United Kingdom, 2 BRIT. MEn. J. 1187 (1976); Skegg, The Case for a Statutory Definition of 
Death, 2 J. MEn. ETHICS 190 (1977). In the Netherlands, see van Till-d' Aulnis de Bourouill, Doodscriteria, 
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considered a homicide, nor the removal of an organ illegal. Only a few years ago, 
cardiac and respiratory arrest were considered to be an incontestable sign of 
death. Medical technology now permits the revitalization of cardiac and re-
spiratory functions and their maintenance through artificial means, even after a 
short arrest. Medical science has established that the deprivation of oxygen 
caused by a temporary circulatory arrest quickly leads to irreversible destruction 
of cerebral functions: first, to the superior cerebral structure which is the center 
of our cognitive and relational functions; then, to the inferior portions of the 
cerebral trunk, which is the center of our essential vegetative functions, such as 
the cardiac and respiratory functions. The complete and irremediable destruc-
tion of these structures constitutes what is called today "brain death" and is the 
true criterion of death, even when the cardiac and respiratory functions are 
artificially maintained. Most Western nations recognize this fact, at least im-
plicitly, and a certain number of statutes explicitly contain this criterion.237 
The Harvard School of Medicine established the most well-known guidelines 
concerning the determination of death. Under these guidelines, a hopeless coma 
is assimilated to death provided that, inter alia, the following signs are also 
present: (I) the absence of spontaneous respiratory movements aside from those 
created by the respirator; (2) the total absence of reflexive reaction to visual, 
audial or tactile stimulation; (3) a flat electroencephalographic reading for ten 
TIJDS V. PRIVAATRECHT 495 (1974). In Germany, Definitions of the Sil5"s and Time of Death: A Statement by 
the Commission on Reexamination and Organ Transplantion Appointed by the German Society of Surgery, 13 
GERM. MED MON. 359 (1968). In Switzerland, see LES DIRECTIVES POUR LA DEFINITION ET LE DIAGNOSTIC 
DE LA MORT (Bate 1968). For a discussion of the problem in France, see J. Savatier, Et in hore mort is 
nostrae, [1968] Dalloz, Chronique XV, 79; Definition de la mort in Les droits de l'homme devant fa mort, REv. 
DR. HOMME 387 (1974); DOLL, supra note 91; Grenouilleau, Commentaire de la Loi No. 76-1181 of 
Dec. 2, 1976, relative aux Prelevements d'Organes, [1977] Dalloz, Chronique XXIX. In Belgium, 
Meudlers-Klein, Corps humain, personnalite et famille en droit beige, 26 TRAvAux DE L'ASSOCIATION 
HENRI CAPITANT 34-39 (1975); Matthijs, supra note 91. 
237. In the United States, 27 states retain in their laws the cessation of cerebral functions as a 
criterion of death, as does the Canadian province of Manitoba. In July of 1981, the President's 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
presented its report on the new uniform definition of death. Supported by the American Medical 
Association and the American Bar Association, the Report proposes that the 50 states adopt as a 
uniform definition of death - "the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including 
the brain stem." See MEDICINE, SCIENCE AND THE LAw 298 (1981). The Report to Parliament of the 
Commission on Reforming the Law of Canada on the Criteria for Determining Death, No. 15 (Ottawa 
1981) opts also for legislative adoption of a definition of death corresponding to the "irreversible 
cessation of all functions of the entire brain." /d. at 27-28. 
Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain and West Germany employ the concept of brain death, without 
having adopted any legal definition of death. In France, the criteria for determining death are defined 
simply by way of ministerial decree. See the Decret No. 78-501 of Mar. 31, 1978 applying the Law of 
Dec. 22, 1976 relative to removal of organs, Journal Officiel, Apr. 4, 1978, ch. IV, Modalite et 
procedure de constation de la mort, art. 21. In Belgium, various proposals of law relative to the 
transplantation of organs and tissues have not contained any definition of death, instead relying on "the 
most recent developments of science for determining death." See Projet de Lai No. 774, No. I, Doc., 
ParI., Ch., 1980-81. The author believes that a precise legislative definition of death is preferable in 
order to avoid all uncertainty, leaving it to proclamations, decrees and decisions to clarify the applicable 
diagnostic methods. See Meulders-Klein, 26 TRAvAux DE L'ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT 37-38 (1975). 
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minutes; and (4) the verification of these tests within the following twenty-four 
hours. Such a state indicates the destruction of both superior and inferior 
cerebral structures.238 However, a patient is not dead when only the superior 
cerebral structures are destroyed, with the vegetative functions still operating. z39 
In such case, the patient's cognitive and relational functions are irremediably 
damaged. 
In light of these criteria, Karen Quinlan could not be considered dead, neither 
before nor after the disconnection of her respirator. The issue in the Quinlan 
case before the Court's decision concerned - and still concerns - the termina-
tion of extraordinary treatment which would involve her death. This question, 
which directly concerns the civil and criminal liability of physicians, Z40 is related 
generally to the patient's right to refuse all treatment. The question entails a 
consideration of other equally significant aspects, such as the relation between 
the quality of life which the patient could expect and the foregoing of medical 
care, as well as the capacity to consent. 
b. The Right to Refuse Treatment and the Quality of Life 
This problem has seen an unprecedented development as medical technology 
has continued to evolve, to the extent that such technology permits man to 
combat the process of natural selection and to push back the boundaries of death 
more efficiently than ever before. It proceeds also from the Western society's 
growing horror of suffering and degradation. 
It is well established in both European and common law that the free and 
knowing consent of the patient, to the extent he is able to provide it, is a 
prerequisite to any medical treatment. A more troubling question is how far a 
patient's right to refuse all treatment and to ask to die extends. This question 
238. This state is called appalic syndrome or vigil coma, opposed to irreversible coma, as described 
above. 
239. Whole-brain death has been up until now the criterion accepted by all the countries which have 
accepted the new definition of death, even if their diagnostic tests differ somewhat. See also the Opinion 
on the Rights of the III and the Dying of the Commission on Legal Questions of the Council of Europe 
relative to the Report of the Commission on Health and Social Questions, Doc. 3735, Jan. 1976, 
defining death not as the irreversible cessation of the heart, but as the irreversible cessation of the brain, 
or brain death. Curiously, Resolution 613 of 1976 insists that only the interests of patient be considered 
in defining the moment of death. To define in such a subjective manner the moment of death is 
juridically inconceivable. On the other hand, Recommendation 779 of 1976 in point 8 speaks in terms of 
"the irreversible arrest of all cerebral functions." 
240. In Canada, Article 199 of the Criminal Code punishes the failure to continue an act once 
undertaken if the omission to do so would endanger life. In France, where murder cannot be commit-
ted by omission, the provisions regarding the rescue of a person in danger are applicable. See the 
proposal of law presented by Messrs. Caillavet and Mezard, to amend Article 63 of the Penal Code by 
excusing the physician from this obligation under certain circumstances. Senat, 1st Session Ord., No. 
29, 1978079. In Belgium, homicide by omission is recognized if the intent to murder is present. See 
Trousse, L'orthothanasie par omission de secours, 1950-51 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL 1102. Prosecution in all 
countries is, however, extremely rare. 
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goes directly to the duty of physicians to heal, using all the means at their 
disposal. 241 
Relatively easy to resolve is the problem of dysthanasia - therapeutic over-
zealousness242 - where needless suffering is inflicted on terminally ill patients by 
prolonging their life, for such treatment clearly cannot be medically justified.243 
Not as clear is the situation where the patient refuses care for personal reasons, 
such as religious belief. The dilemma becomes most acute when medical inter-
vention alone is capable of saving and healing a patient in danger of imminent 
death, as in the case of an emergency blood transfusion refused on religious 
grounds. In this case, are the wishes of the patient the sole determining factor? 
In both European and common law, hesitation is evident. 244 The cases cited in 
Quinlan contain precedent for a court to avoid a patient's refusal of a transfu-
sion. 24 ;; However, these cases also contain support for the patient's right to 
self-determination and religious freedom, provided any refusal does not create a 
danger to the public health, well-being and morals. 246 
The Court distinguished the Quinlan case by relying on criteria such as the 
terminal state of the patient, the patient's familial and social responsibilities and 
the quality of life under treatment, factors which indicate that the consent of the 
patient will not always be determinative. Significantly, the Court brought the Roe 
and Quinlan decisions together by enlarging the right of privacy to encompass, 
241. See the Opinion of the Commission on Legal Questions of the Council of Europe on the Rights 
of the III and the Dying, Doc. 3735, especially Nos. 23-24 and the Recommendation 779 (1976) of the 
Council of Europe, point 9 [hereinafter cited as the Opinion of the Commission on Legal Questions of 
the Council of Europe]. 
242. On the distinction between dysthanasia, orthothanasia (the abstention or termination of useless 
treatment, often called erroneously "passive euthanasia"), and active euthanasia, see S. Pelletier, De 
l'euthanasie, l'orthothanasie et la dysthanasie, 1952 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL 217; the Report 
on the Rights of the III and the Dying of the Commission on Social and Health Questions of the Council 
of Europe, Doc. 3699 No. 24, and the Opinion of the Commission on Legal Questions, Nos. 3735, 
9 et seq; the DIRECTIVES CONCERNANT L'EUTHANASIE, of the ACADEMIE SUISSE DES SCIENCES MEDICALES 
(Bate 1976); the Report of the Law Reform Commission on Reforming the Law of Canada on 
Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment, Serie Protection de la Vie, Doc. No. 28 (1982). 
243. See the Opinion of the Commission on Legal Questions of the Council of Europe, supra note 
241. 
244. Certain authors maintain that necessity vitiates the lack of consent on the part of the patient. See 
MAYRAND, supra note 1; Somerville, supra note 32, at 43,129; Cox, The Qualified Right to ReJuse Medical 
Treatmem, 13 J. FAM. L. 153 (1973-1974); Nerson, Le respect pour le medecin de la volonte du malade 853, 
854-80 MELANGES MARTY 1978; Kornprobst, Peut-on admettre un reJus de transfuswn sanguine? LA 
NOUVELLE PRESSE MEDICALE (1974). See also Article 7 of the CODE DE DEONTOLOGIE MEDICALE FRANCAIS, 
Decret No. 79-506, June 28, 1979 at 233: "La volonte du malade doit toujours etre respectee, dans toute 
la mesure du possible." (The wishes of the patient should be respected to the fullest extent possible -
transl.). 
245. See Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. 
1964),cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Raleigh Fitkin Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 
N.Y. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); J.F.K. Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 
N.H. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). In Raleigh Fitkin the court ignored the refusal ofa pregnant woman to 
undergo a transfusion, in order to save the life of the infant. Generally, in the United States and 
Europe, protecting the child's life comes before respecting the mother's right of refusal. 
246. In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (1972). 
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in certain circumstances, the right to die. The Court holds that the state's 
preponderant interest in protecting life at the expense of the patient's freedom 
of choice diminishes to the extent the prognosis becomes unfavorable. Finally, a 
moment arrives when the right of privacy prevails over the state's right to protect 
life, just as the freedom of the mother at a certain threshold stage of pregnancy 
triumphs over the state's interest in protecting the life of the future child. 247 The 
effect of the two decisions is most remarkable in that it creates, at both ex-
tremities oflife, a free zone: in the first case, by entitling the mother to break off 
her pregnancy; and in the second case, by affording the patient the right to die. 
Moreover, these cases establish a possible balance between the quality of life for 
the patient and the state's interest in protecting his existence. A "meaningful" life 
is contrasted with a life without meaning, and the Court's affirmation that the 
state's interest begins to wane after a certain point expresses this idea with rare 
frankness. Its impact is even greater in those situations where the patient is 
himself incapable of expressing his wishes.248 
c. The Refusal of Treatment or the Request to Die and the Capacity to Consent 
Recent developments in American, Canadian and even European jurispru-
dence appear to surpass the distinctions referred to in the Quinlan decision in 
favor of a tendency to recognize a general and unconditional right of every 
individual to refuse all treatment, even if such refusal means his death,249 and 
thus to request his death.250 To make such a request, the patient must retain a 
certain capacity of discernment and expression. Whatever the scope of the right, 
247. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
248. But see TRIBE, supra note 166, at 936. See also Bai, Implications of the Karen Quinlan Case, Real 
and Imaginary, 5th World Congress of Medical Law 1979, Gand., Doc. Roneo., vol. II at 278-84. 
249. Common law traditionally recognized the right to refuse medical treatment except as provided 
otherwise by law. See the Law Reform Commission of Canada, in Medical Treatment and Criminal Law, 
Doc. No. 26 at 81, 82-85, 103. The American Hospital Association, in the Patient's Bill of Rights of Nov. 
17, 1972, recognizes the right of the patient to refuse treatment to the extent authorized by law. 
In France, a decision of the Chambre Criminelle de la Cour de Cassation of Jan. 3, 1973 [1973] 
Bulletin Criminel No.2 at 4, acquitted a physician of charges of professional irresponsibility and 
involuntary manuslaughter for failing to aid a patient in danger. The doctor had chosen not to treat a 
woman who had tried to commit suicide and had left a note declaring her wish to refuse treatment. On 
the other hand, the Tribunal Correctionnel and the Cour d' Appel of Besan~on, on May 9 and 
November 15, 1973, respectively, convicted the accused of involuntary manslaughter for having caused 
an accident in which the victim, because of religious convictions, refused a blood transfusion. The 
Decree of Jan. 15, 1974 on hospital administration provides in Article 42 that a patient may refuse 
treatment on the basis of a signed, written document to that effect. 
250. In Great Britain, several attempts have been made to legalize active euthanasia and de-
criminalizing the aiding of suicide, respectively in 1950, 1969 and 1976, without success as yet. In the 
United States, several bills recently have been introduced along similar lines in Idaho (1969), Montana 
(1973), Oregon (1973) and Florida (1973 and 1976). In Switzerland, a referendum in 1977 in the 
Canton of Zurich on the possibility of allowing a physician, upon request of an incurably ill patient, to 
prescribe active euthanasia was approved by a majority but was without legal effect. See Euthanasie, 
Aide au suicide et interruption de traitement, Doc. de la Commission de Reforme du Droit du Canada, 
Working Paper 28, at 22 et seq. and 52 (1982). 
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its recognition depends on whether the person is in a state of consciousness or 
unconsciousness. Furthermore, among those patients who are incapable of ex-
pressing themselves or their wishes, it is necessary to distinguish between those 
who have fallen into such state by accident, and those who have never possessed 
the capacity. Numbering among the former are comatose and terminal patients 
whose faculties have so degenerated that they are no longer capable of know-
ingly expressing their free and conscious wishes. Aside from the impossibility of 
even formulating any request, the value of any request, which might possibly be 
articulated, is therefore considerably affected.251 
To circumvent the risk, several states have enacted laws such as the California 
Natural Death Act of 1976,252 which permits a person to take preventative 
measures in his living will, under which he may declare in advance his wish to 
refuse extraordinary treatment which would prolong an otherwise meaningless 
life.253 Other societies which advocate active euthanasia propose "euthanasia by 
testament."254 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to know whether such a will can effectively protect 
the wishes of the patient at the moment when it can be effectuated. It would be 
undoubtedly unwise to place physicians in a position where they would feel 
obliged to carry out an act desired by the patient which, at the very most, should 
serve only as an evidentiary indication of his former wishes. 255 
Absent any testamentary act, discovering the wishes of the patient or deciding 
on his spokesman are difficult tasks indeed. Even more difficult is the situation of 
those who have never been aware enough to formulate their wishes and con-
template the kind of life they might hope for: for example, newborn children 
and toddlers afHicted with serious congenital or accidental disabilities,256 or 
251. See, as to the psychological ambivalence in requests for "death with dignity" and the termination 
of treatment, Jackson & Younger, Patient Autonomy and Death with Dignity, Some Clinical Caveats, NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 404 (1979). 
252. See CALlFDRNIA HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§ 71, 85, 95 (West 1976). 
253. See Flannery, Statutory Recognition of the Righi to Die: The California Natural Death Act, 57 B. U. L. 
REv. 148 (1977); Randall, The Righi to Die a Natural Death: A Discussion of In re Quinlan and the California 
Natural Death Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 192 (1977). 
254. See Moore, The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia, UMKC L. REv. 327 (1972-74). 
255. For a position against this type of legislation, see Death with Dignity, Report of the Committee 
on Medicine and Law, Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 119 (1977); the 
Report of the Law Reform Commission on Reforming the Law of Canada, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide 
and Termination of Treatment 49-59 (1982); The Opinion of the Commission on Legal Matters of the 
Council of Europe on the Rights of the III and the Dying, Doc. 3735 No. 11 (1976). 
256. See Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemnas in the Special Care Nursery, NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 
(1973); Fletcher, Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns, 2 HASTINGS CENTER STUD. 21 (1974); Fletcher, 
Abortion, Euthanasia and Care of Defective Newborns, NEW ENG. J. MED. 75 (1975); Robertson & Frost, 
Passive Euthanasia of Defective Newborn Infants: Legal Considerations, J. PEDIATRICS 883 (1976); Robertson, 
Involuntary Euthansia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1975); Mueller & 
Phoenix, A Dikmma for the Legal and Medical Professions: Euthanasia and the Defective Newborn, 22 ST. LoUIS 
U. L. J. 501 (1978). 
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mental incompetents,257 Who could decide what they would be willing to endure 
or not endure, and under what criteria? Anglo-American societies have already 
opened this debate, Two American decisions have given divergent answers to the 
first question, In the Quinlan case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that 
the decision belongs to the family, after consultation with the patient's physicians 
and hospital ethics committee, In the Saikewciz decision,258 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held that only a court is capable of deciding with inde-
pendence and im partiality. Certain authors maintain that only the legislature can 
fix the appropriate authority and procedures. 259 As to the proper criteria, where 
the patient's wishes cannot be known, the deciding factor should be what a 
reasonable person would consider to be in the patient's greater interest. 
The issue is not the blind protection oflife for life's sake. Rather, the question 
concerns the applicable criteria defining the quality of life. Who can guarantee 
that the subjective factor of the quality of life, evaluated in the eyes of "reason-
able persons,"260 combined with the substituted consent of those same persons, 
will not result in a new type of social eugenism: for example, in the case of 
retarded children? What impact on behavior would legislation have which might 
purport to regulate explicitly such situations? Here again, the objective criterion 
of utility or uselessness of any medical treatment intended to im prove the 
situation of an incompetent patient offers a more certain and tangible way to 
evaluate the proper course to take. 261 
The wishes of the conscious patient are without doubt easier to determine but 
are not easier to respect in every case. This situation leads us to the ultimate 
question: if we recognize the right of a person to voluntarily refuse medical 
treatment, why should we hesitate before the question of suicide and in the 
aiding and abetting of suicide? Why not legalize euthanasia upon request, which 
might be found so "reasonable" in certain circumstances?262 Does the ex plana-
257. See generally, Keyserlinck, The Sacred Character of Life of the Quality of Life, Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, Protection of Life, Study Paper 167 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Keyserlinck]; 
Annas, The Incompetent's Righi to Die: The Case of joseph Saikewicz, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (1978). 
258. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.11 (1977). 
259. The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care for Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
285 (1976); MacMillan, Birth Defective Infants: A Standardfor Nontreatment Decisrons, 30 STAN. L. REv. 599 
(1978). 
260. The relationship between quality of life and quality of being (qualitt de personnel, and more 
particularly between such quality and aptitude for consciousness of self and the ability to interact with 
others present some considerable hazards. See Keyserlinck, supra note 257, at 79, and the particularly 
radical theories of Fletcher, Indicatrons of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
2.5 (1972) 1-4; Four Indications of Humanhood, The Enquiry Matures, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 4.6 (1974), 
4·7. 
261. See Euthanasie, aide an suicide et interruption de traitement, Doc. de la Commission de 
RHorme du Droit du Canada, Working Paper 28 (1982); McCall, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment 
and the Criminal Law, V' Congress mondial de droit medical, Gand, 1979, Doc. Roneo., vol. II, pp. 266-69. 
262. See the clear refusal expressed by Recommendation 779 (1976) of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, point 7, and by the Commission de RHorme du Droit du Canada, supra note 
261. 
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tion for this hesitation lie in man's need to protect himself against his own 
weakness? What greater stakes, higher than even freedom itself, are hidden 
behind this last line of resistance? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Having reached this stage, one might perhaps ask: why choose the American 
example to illustrate this problem? After all, Europeans have not been raised on 
the philosophies of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Euro-
peans have not been taught that the individual is only free to the extent he is the 
sovereign owner of his person and property, and that the sole mission of 
goyernment is 10 guarantee these rights. Furthermore, Europeans know as well 
that their Declarations of Rights and Constitutions create, at the same time, both 
their freedom and the boundaries which limit it. 
The truth is, however, that the same debate cuts across all cultures and legal 
systems, at least of the Western nations, on the social level with the same 
technical and scientific progress, and the same evolution in attitudes - as well as 
on the juridical level. The examples cited in the course of this article illustrate 
this fact. Even though until today the concept of "privacy" is more often trans-
lated as "intimacy of the private life" than as "self-determination" in European 
countries, Article 8 of the European Convention on the Rights of Man poten-
tially lends itself to development in a way analogous to that of the right of 
privacy.263 It would be assuredly childish and absurd on our part to disavow 
today the progress made in medicine, just as it would be futile to blame it for its 
errors or deny its problems. Science in this area, as in other domains, is nothing 
more than an instrument, more or less manageable, in the hands of man, for 
better or for worse. It is an instrument whose existence constitutes certainly a 
point of no-return, but whose deployment is incumbent upon us. Unless, pursu-
ing an infinitely more subtle hypothesis, it is society itself which is struggling for 
its survival against an excess oflife or diminished life in an overcrowded world -
a hypothesis which deserves to be more closely examined - what lies ultimately 
at the heart of the debate is less with the conflict between protecting life and 
protecting freedom than the individual search for happiness in the existential 
tri~ngle formed, since time immemorial, by life, sex and death. Of the three 
rights proclaimed at the beginning of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, it is 
the last one which here assuredly takes the lead. And medicine, like law, is 
becoming the servant of this right of happiness. It is not, however, more rational 
to protect life at any price than to sanctify happiness at whatever cost, even if it is 
263. See the European Convention on Human Rights. The development in the interpretive method of 
the European Court is reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court. See the Marckx case and the decision of the 
European Commission on Human Rights in X v. United Kingdom, supra note 164. 
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legitimate and necessary to employ all our resources to diminish suffering. It is 
undoubtedly in this measured spirit that humankind must itself draw the boun-
daries of its own freedom. 
Translated by Michael J. Matsler 
